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ABSTRACT 
KERBS, MEGAN K. The Evolution, Dynamics and Trends of the 
Content of Chinese Exports from 1995-2011 
Departments of Economics and Political Science, June 2016. 
 
 There is no question that China’s role in the international economy has grown over time, 
as it seems to be claiming more and more of center stage in the global arena. Back in the early 
1990’s, the phenomenon of globalization enabled China to expand its reach, inserting itself into 
intricate production hierarchies that began to define the global marketplace. China experienced a 
massive export boom in 2000, and since, has evolved to become a highly sophisticated, high-tech 
country that now plays an integral role within not only the East Asian region, but also the rest of 
the world. This thesis will examine China’s extraordinary growth through the analysis of the 
evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of Chinese exports from 1995-2011. It will focus 
specifically on China’s electronics industry—since level of technology is often indicative of 
level of development—in order to make speculative conclusions about China’s future growth and 
sustainability. Ultimately, through a regional cross-comparison and the examination of extensive 
trade data, this paper seeks to investigate the significance of China’s location within the larger 
East Asian region and whether this aspect of regionalization either enhances or limits China’s 
technological development and potential growth. The results obtained provide evidence that due 
to East Asia’s distinct character, indeed, much of the significance behind China’s success lies in 
the regionalism that defines East Asia. Furthermore, despite China’s export growth and the 
increase in DVA seen within its electronics sector, a “leveling off phenomenon” set in in 2004 
and has continued to prevail.  
  
	  	   iii	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND TIME PERIOD 4 
C. MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THESIS 4 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 5 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 7 
A. FLYING GEESE PARADIGM 7 
B. EAST ASIAN REGIONAL NEXUS 9 
C. VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION 11 
D. TRADE IN VALUE ADDED 12 
E. DOMESTIC VALUE ADDED 16 
F. CHINA’S GROSS EXPORT BASKET 17 
G. CONCLUSION 19 
CHAPTER THREE: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  22 
A. INTRODUCTION: CHINA AND ITS ENORMOUS GROWTH 22 
B. CHINA’S EXPORT PERFORMANCE 27 
C. CHINA’S PERFORMANCE IN ELECTRONICS 29 
D. DOMESTIC VALUE ADDED (DVA) 32 
E. FOREIGN VALUE ADDED (FVA) 33 
F. CONCLUSION 35 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND RESULTS 38 
A. INTRODUCTION TO DATA 38 
B. PROVIDING CLARITY: AVERAGE, STANDARD DEVIATION, COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 40 
C. REGIONAL CROSS COMPARISON: EAST ASIA AND EUROPE 46 
D. CHINA WITHIN THE EAST ASIAN REGION 51 
E. LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT 55 
F. INTERNATIONAL THEORIES OF TRADE TO EXPLAIN THE DATA 61 
G. CHINA’S “LEVELING OFF PHENOMENON” 62 
H. CONCLUSION 66 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 68 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 68 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 71 
	  	   iv	  
BIBLOGRAPHY 73 
APPENDIX 75 
TABLES 80 
	  
  
	  	   1	  
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Background Information 
Since its economic reforms began in 1978, China has experienced a rapid growth in 
exports, which has contributed to the country’s impressive economic growth. Coinciding with 
this export boom has been an increase in exports of electronics, leading some scholars to assert 
that China is swiftly rising through the international division of labor due to the existence of its 
own specific effective industrial policy and providential timing (Rodrik 2006).  
Others argue that China’s advantages derive from its fortuitous location within the 
developing East Asian region. In other words, regional factors—not country factors—are critical 
to China’s catch-up. In this version, China is the most recent member of the ‘Flying Geese’ 
theory of East Asian development, first proposed by a Japanese scholar (Akamatsu 1962), but 
later developed by other scholars (Cumings 1984, Bernard and Ravenhill 1995). The East Asian 
region is a widespread nexus of countries with diverse economic levels of development. It 
encompasses China, along with the countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. South East Asia—Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines—lies nearby, 
resulting in an extensive collection of heterogeneous countries, each of which adds its own 
distinct piece to the larger puzzle: Japan and its innovative, next-generation technology; Korea 
and Taiwan contributing advanced manufacturing, medium technology, and high- or medium- 
skilled labor; and China and Southeast Asia with their lower skilled workforces and labor 
intensive activities. Because of this regionalized nature, many scholars—including those who 
support the Flying Geese paradigm—assert that the complexities of East Asia’s industrial 
production process cannot actually be replicated country after country. Instead, industrial 
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diffusion’s shifting hierarchical networks of production leads to only partial dispersion into other 
countries’ diverse frameworks (Ravenhill and Bernard 1995). 
 Understanding the role of regional factors in China’s economic rise is important for 
policy and theory alike. For instance, if regional factors are critical, then this indicates that 
China’s policies, or distinctive state-market hybrid economy, are not as important as some 
suggest (Naughton and Tsai 2015). It also would suggest that the prospects for development 
among countries that are not part of a similarly dynamic economic region would potentially be 
more difficult. There is something to be said for the idea that the East Asian states have a certain 
strength—unlike those that lie on the periphery—reflected in the nature of the region-specific 
networks of production and industrial diffusion, transnational capital and multinational 
corporations, all of which a country on the outside of this diverse East Asian region would not 
benefit from.  
Aligned with the concept of each country adding its own special piece to the larger trade 
puzzle is the new trade reality that has been created by the phenomenon of global vertical 
specialization. Also referred to as fragmentation of production, this specialization deepens the 
interdependency of trade relations, as it shapes the degree of specialization of the different 
economies involved in the international production chain (Hummels et. al 2001). Global 
production now consists of a network of individual suppliers who specialize in distinct services 
or stages of production. Currently, production is sliced and diced into separate fragments that are 
then spread out across the globe. This produces the phenomenon of “trade in value added 
(TiVA),” a concept in which any given export, or good for that matter, can be broken down into 
value-added contributions from various domestic industries and various foreign industries 
(WTO, IDE-JETRO 2011). Now that production has been increasingly fragmented across 
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countries, and roughly two-thirds of international trade is trade in intermediate inputs, the effect 
is that countries such as China—and other major nations that are late developers—have become 
much more engaged in globalization (Johnson and Noguera 2012). 
This has drawn significant attention to the growing awareness that conventional trade 
statistics may actually provide a misleading perspective of the importance of trade to economic 
growth (Maurer and Degain 2010). Conventional measures of gross trade flows can be deceptive 
in that the value of products that cross borders several times for further processing—think 
vertical specialization—is counted multiple times. This results in two distinct issues: first, 
bilateral trade imbalances, again measured conventionally; second, confusion among researchers, 
who attempt to accurately measure and differentiate between domestic value added (DVA), 
foreign value added (FVA), and gross versus net terms.  
As an illustration, consider Apple’s 30GB iPod video (Dedrick, Linden and Kraemer, 
2011). In 2006, the Chinese export value for a unit of this model equaled $150 USD. When 
broken down into its component parts such as display screen, microchip and processors, how 
much of this $150 value is attributable to producers in China? Surprisingly, only $4 (Kee and 
Tang 2012). The production of Apple’s iPod video has been broken down, offshored, and 
outsourced—as it is designed and marketed by an American company, assembled by Taiwanese 
manufacturers in China, and includes key parts from Japanese, Korean and U.S. suppliers—
forcing us to ask the question, who captures the value generated by this enormously successful 
innovation? Due to the phenomenon of vertical specialization and complex measures such as 
trade in value added, the creation today of a successful final product in the global electronics 
industry—such as the iPod—spreads the wealth far beyond just the lead firm, to other 
beneficiaries such as partners in the firm’s supply chain, or firms that offer complementary 
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products or services (Dedrick, Linden and Kraemer, 2011). 
B. Research Question and Time Period 
In order to further assess this question of value added, but at a larger scale for the whole 
of China, this thesis asks the following question: What are the dynamics, trends, and evolution of 
the content of Chinese exports? This paper will focus on the time period from 1995-2011, 
specifically drawing on the following four years: 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2011. The selected time 
period is owed to data availability within the utilized database: TiVA OECD.STAT. This 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) database includes 61 
economies, 34 unique industrial sectors, including 16 manufacturing and 14 services sectors. A 
focus on the chosen four years will provide an effective framework to examine changes—every 
five years or so—within the industry. It will largely concentrate on the electronics industry, 
which is referred to as C30T33: Electrical and optical equipment at a larger scale and category, 
and C30T33X: Computer, Electronic and optical equipment at a more granular scale and 
subcategory. My working hypothesis is that the domestic value added (DVA) category of 
China’s electronics industry has increased since 1995, while its foreign value added (FVA) 
category has actually decreased.  
C. Motivation and Significance of Research 
So that we can thoroughly understand the economic significance of this thesis question 
and hypothesis, let us first examine the following hypothetical question: What is the economic 
significance of Good 1 having 90% of its value added done in China, while Good 2 only has 
10% of its value added completed there? Similarly, what can be gathered from a good that 
consists of 10% DVA in 1995, but then increases to 90% DVA by 2011? These questions enable 
us to consider a more tangible situation regarding the significance of this paper. Now, based on 
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my hypothesis that DVA in China’s electronics industry has increased, one could argue that this 
increase of DVA bodes well for China’s future. Innovation, technology and “know how” are 
often touted as key drivers of economic growth (Mansfield 1995). It is no secret that a high-level 
of electronic sophistication correlates with technological innovation, which enables countries to 
foster economic development, improve levels of training and education, and create the 
opportunity for small business development and entrepreneurship. It is also important to note that 
as of December 2015, electronic exports make up around 24.4% of China’s gross export pie. 
Clearly, a share that occupies one quarter of China’s gross exports is significant enough to focus 
on and dissect. This is especially true since electronics induce innovation and dynamism, 
whereas the automotive industry, along with many other sectors, does not to the same extent. 
This results in the ability to presume the electronics industry holds relevant significance 
pertaining to China’s future, as well as allow us to assess China’s continuing economic growth 
and stature in the global arena. 
Ultimately, the overarching significance of my empirical work and "regional" perspective 
is that it offers a truer picture of: one, the existence and extent of hierarchy in the international 
economy and in particular East Asian regionalism; and two, it contextualizes the "rise of China," 
which many have touted as fast and inevitable. By zeroing in on the electronics industry, I am 
examining whether or not there are impediments to China's future rise.    
D. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I and V are the introduction and 
conclusion, respectively. The following chapters—chapters II, III, and IV—provide the basis for 
empirical analysis and then present the findings of that analysis.  In chapter II, I review the 
current literature related to the content and growth of China’s exports. The themes that are most 
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relevant and significant to this topic are the following: the Flying Geese Paradigm, East Asian 
Regional Nexus, Vertical Specialization, Trade in Value Added, Domestic Value Added and 
China’s Gross Export Basket. It is by these themes that I will divide up the literature review 
section. In chapter III, I elaborate on the analytical framework of this paper. This section will 
open with an introduction to the phenomenon of China’s enormous growth. Its history of 
reforms, changes, and major macroeconomic indicators will be discussed. China’s overall export 
performance, as well as the performance of its electronics industry in particular, will be 
elaborated upon in this section, with sections on domestic value added, foreign value added, and 
a brief conclusion to follow. Chapter IV examines and analyzes the data and results that are 
found, while Chapter V reviews the conclusions from the empirical analysis. It will discuss 
various implications of the conclusions drawn and potentially some suggestions for the future as 
well. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This thesis studies the evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of China’s exports 
through the examination of the Flying Geese Paradigm, East Asian regional nexus, vertical 
specialization, trade in value added, domestic value added and China’s gross export basket. Each 
of the texts this paper will review contributes a new and significant aspect to the chosen theme in 
which it falls under. However, to my knowledge, none of these works directly ask the question 
that I hope to answer in this thesis: What are the dynamics, trends, and evolution of the content 
of Chinese exports from 1995-2011? By specifically focusing on the breakdown of gross 
electronics exports into domestic value added (DVA) and foreign value added (FVA), this 
paper’s empirical scope will use largely the electronics industry to thoroughly analyze and 
uncover the true meaning of what an increase or decrease in DVA and FVA may mean in terms 
of China’s future economic growth, stature, and ultimately, its sustainability. 
A. Flying Geese Paradigm 
 The literature on the Flying Geese Paradigm (FGP) originally dates back to 1962, when 
Kaname Akamatsu created this concept to use as a tool when describing the regional production 
patterns in East Asia. His text discusses the impossibility of studying the economic growth of 
developing countries in modern times without reflecting on the mutual interactions between 
these emerging countries and those of the advanced counties (Akamatsu 1962). Akamatsu set out 
to explain the development trajectories of less developed countries and created the FGP as a 
means to do so. The lead goose in this V-shaped formation is Japan itself, while the second-tier 
of the model consists of newly industrializing economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Following close behind are the ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
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Asian Nations) countries—Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand—with the least developed nations 
in the region bringing up the rear guard in the formation: China, Vietnam, Philippines, etc. 
Cumings then applied this analogy to the situation in East Asia: countries are said to follow one 
another in a developmental trajectory where the latecomers exactly replicate the developmental 
experience of the countries ahead of them in the configuration (Cumings 1984). In other words, 
Japan’s whole electronics industry, for example, would shift or be replicated to other countries 
nearby. Cumings provides a beneficial reminder that East Asia’s regionalization of production 
has its foundations in the Japanese colonial period (Cumings 1984). Since Japanese production in 
countries like Korea and Taiwan was a fundamental part of the pre-1945 Japanese empire, it 
comes as no surprise that Japanese firms directly invested in Taiwanese industry, such as its 
electronics and machinery manufacturing (Cumings 1984). As a result, Japan has held a 
competitive advantage in these industries for quite some time, which has created the expectation 
that its developmental trajectory and industry production patterns are to be exactly replicated by 
countries around it. Cumings’ perspective supports the argument that a regional perspective is 
vital in understanding the contemporary East Asian pattern of industrialization. 
However, this Flying Geese Paradigm also consists of an opposing argument. Some 
scholars, such as Ravenhill and Bernard (1995), assert that because of East Asia’s regionalized 
nature, the complexities of its industrial production process cannot be replicated country after 
country; instead, industrial diffusion has been defined by shifting hierarchical networks of 
production that has led to only partial dispersion into other developing countries’ diverse 
frameworks. Because only parts of industries and their production processes are replicated from 
country to country, Japan, for example, continues to remain at the head of the V-formation that 
corresponds to Akamatsu’s Flying Geese Paradigm. Japan is generally considered to be East 
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Asia’s most advanced nation. Its high R&D spending, great capacity to innovate, large pool of 
available talent to draw from, and top-notch research institutions enable it to comfortably enjoy a 
competitive edge in both business and technology sophistication. As a result, Japan sustains its 
spot as the leading East Asian country in the FGP model of international division of labor based 
on comparative advantage.  
Ravenhill and Bernard’s argument directly exhibits the concept of fragmentation of 
production. As countries’ production processes become more and more specialized, with each 
nation becoming especially talented in one or two distinct pieces of the manufacturing puzzle, 
the notion of fragmentation of production arises. So, because Japan continues to excel at what it 
is best at—innovation, for example—only parts of its industries and their production processes 
are replicated by and within the countries following behind it. In fact, as time goes on, certain 
industries may be entirely passed on to less developed countries that exist at the back of the V-
formation. For example, today’s textile industry has largely left not only Japan, but also South 
Korea and Taiwan—second tier countries in the FGP—and now resides primarily in the third tier 
East Asian countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. To sum up Ravenhill and 
Bernard’s argument, East Asian production should not be viewed as a “tightly coupled process in 
which the rise of national economies parallels successive product cycles” (Ravenhill and Bernard 
1995).  
B. East Asian Regional Nexus 
 The role of regional factors in China’s economic rise is essential to understand in terms 
of both policy and theory. The scholars that support the “regionalism” explanation for East Asian 
development assert that it is the existence of regional networks throughout East Asia—which 
have given rise to regionalized networks of production and industrial diffusion—that have made 
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the developmental paths of East Asian new industrialized countries (NICs) uniquely successful 
(Ravenhill and Bernard 1995). If we assume that it is indeed these regional factors that are the 
critical component to China’s economic rise, then this indicates that China’s policies or 
distinctive state-market hybrid economy are not as important as some suggest (Naughton and 
Tsai 2015). Naughton and Tsai’s text argues that it is China’s distinct form of state capitalism 
that has enabled the Chinese economic growth miracle that followed 1978. To further examine 
this argument, the text asks the following questions: Is China following in the footsteps of its 
developmental state neighbors in East Asia? Among the global spectrum of political and 
economic models, which are most relevant to China’s future? These inquiries both relate to 
China’s individual form of state capitalism that has various implications for industrial 
competitiveness, government-business relations, corporate governance and domestic welfare 
(Naughton and Tsai 2015). “State capitalism” emphasizes state-owned enterprises and state 
business, as it captures China’s combination of a predominately market economy, its emerging 
capital markets and its large and prominent government-owned corporations. These features of 
the Chinese system have enabled its impressive economic and export growth, which support the 
argument backed by Naughton and Tsai that it is China’s extraordinary growth is due to its 
distinct state system. 
However, if we assert that the previously discussed regional factors outweigh the 
importance of China’s policies and distinctive state-market hybrid economy, then it would 
suggest that the prospects for development among countries that are not a part of a similarly 
dynamic economic region—such as East Asia—would be potentially more difficult. There is 
something to be said for the idea that the East Asian states—unlike those that lie on the 
periphery—have a certain strength reflected in the nature of the region-specific networks of 
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production and industrial diffusion, all of which a country on the outside of this diverse East 
Asian region would not benefit from.  
C. Vertical Specialization  
The phenomenon of vertical specialization is considered by some scholars to have 
changed the nature of world trade, as it creates an additional component of intricacy to the 
dynamics of production. Dramatic changes are occurring, as production processes increasingly 
consist of a sequential, vertical trading chain that transcends boundaries, with each country 
specializing in particular stages of the production sequence of a good. In order for vertical 
specialization to take place, the following components must exist: 1) a good is produced in two 
or more sequential stages; 2) two or more countries provide value-added during the production of 
the good; and 3) at least one country must use imported inputs in its stage of the production 
process, and some of the resulting output must be exported” (Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001). 
Given the proliferation of models that have been developed by trade economists to study the 
impact of vertical specialization on production and trade patterns, one might presume that 
extensive empirical documentation of the increase of vertical specialization exists. In fact, this is 
not the case. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) originally spearheaded the analysis of vertical 
specialization, which led to the creation of more complex databases such as OECD that 
incorporated complicated measures such as value-added. Their text provides a narrower model of 
vertical specialization by involving the imported goods that are then used as inputs in a country’s 
export goods. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) argue that great changes are occurring in the nature 
of international trade pertaining to vertical specialization. By using input-output tables from 10 
OECD and four emerging market countries—two of which are Korea and Taiwan—industry-
level data on imported inputs, gross output, and exports enables us to conclude the following: 
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Vertical specialization accounts for 30% growth in these countries exports (Hummels, Ishii and 
Yi 2001). Clearly, this phenomenon now plays a significant role in the world of production, as it 
positively affects growth in a country’s export levels by involving other countries and their 
goods—primarily inputs from developed nations that are transformed and then exported to other 
developed nations—into its trading chains. 
To further discuss the phenomenon of vertical specialization, Amador and Cabral (2009) 
examine the dynamics and international distribution of vertical specialization. Using information 
combined from input-output matrices and international trade data, as well as a measure that 
identifies a country’s trade flow pertaining to its VS activities, the results point to a significant 
increase of vertical specialization in high-technology products—in particular, radio, TV and 
communications equipment—over the last two decades. In addition, there is also empirical 
evidence that there is a sharp increase of vertical specialization activities in East Asia, 
specifically in the first level of new industrialized economies like Hong Kong and South Korea 
(Amador and Cabral 2009). Both of these findings are telling, for an increase in vertical 
specialization among high-technology products, especially in East Asia, will correlate with the 
increases and decreases in DVA and FVA, respectively, that I hypothesize have occurred within 
China’s electronics industry. Moreover, the discussion of East Asia’s geographical relevance in 
terms of increasing vertical specialization will greatly add to my added contributions, which are 
examined later on in this thesis.  
D. Trade in Value Added 
Due to the now very prevalent dynamic of vertical specialization that exists within and 
throughout the world of production and trade, the concept of “trade in value added” (TiVA) has 
become all the more necessary to understand. Trade in value added takes into account the 
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fragmentation of the value chains and provides a breakdown of gross exports by domestic and 
foreign origin, creating the concepts of “domestic value added” and “foreign value added” 
(WTO, IDE-JETRO 2011).  
Trade analysts, through the value added approach, can explore new perspectives on world 
trade. Let us examine the following example that tangibly illustrates the significance of what 
“value added” entails: The redistribution of trade between Asian trading partners of the United 
States is commonplace due to the rapid increase in international and regional supply chains, with 
part of the production initially located in Japan or in other economies transferring to China. 
Typically, the assembly of the final products, which relocates to China, is the last stage of the 
supply chain, as the production of the core components remains within the original country. 
Thus, while customs statistics show China to be the principal country of origin for US imports—
think of the “Made in China” tag we see on every Apple product, for example—most of the 
content of the products, as well as their economic value, is actually still originating in the Asian 
partner or even within the United States itself (WTO, IDE-JETRO 2011). 
To further discuss the concept of trade in value added, Johnson and Noguera (2012) 
examine the question of how to account for the value added content of bilateral trade. They 
utilize the VAX ratio (ratio of value added to gross exports) as a measure of the intensity of 
production sharing, which can be interpreted as a metric of domestic content of exports. Through 
a global input-output framework used to estimate the value added content of trade, and bilateral 
trade statistics and input-output tables compiled from the World Bank and IMF macroeconomic 
and Balance of Payments and United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade) Database, 
Johnson and Noguera find that the U.S.—China value added imbalance is 30-40% smaller than 
the gross imbalance, which shows that bilateral value added trade imbalances differ from gross 
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trade imbalances. A significant component of this imbalance has to do with the measurement of 
trade in value added on a net basis at each step of the vertical trading chain, while gross exports 
are measured in gross terms (WTO, IDE-JETRO 2011). 
As Johnson and Noguera’s findings show, the problem of trade imbalance due to 
difference in measurement method is substantial. As a result, significant attention has been 
drawn to the growing awareness that conventional trade statistics may actually provide a 
misleading perspective of the importance of trade to economic growth (Maurer and Degain 
2010). Again, conventional measures of gross trade flows can be deceptive in that the value of 
products that cross borders several times for further processing—think vertical specialization—
are counted multiple times. Therefore, a general confusion has been said to have risen among 
academics, political economists and trade analysts, all of whom attempt to accurately measure 
and differentiate between domestic value added (DVA), foreign value added (FVA), and gross 
versus net terms. The evolution of global supply chains and the related expansion of vertical 
trade call for the development of new measures of international trade (IDE-JETRO). The 
quantification of cross-boarder production connections is absolutely critical in order to answer a 
wide range of important empirical questions in both international trade and macroeconomics. 
While it is necessary to examine various academics’ findings on the concept of trade in 
value added, we cannot forget to ask one of the simplest yett most vital questions—Why is this 
important? As previously mentioned, with global production sharing expanding, gross trade 
flows are providing an increasingly misleading picture of the economic importance of trade and 
production. Measuring trade on a value-added basis allows us to better grasp key features of 
international trade (Logan 2013). For example, exports calculated on a value-added basis—
instead of on a gross basis—are a smaller portion of global activity since imported intermediates 
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are accounted for but not included in gross exports (Logan 2013). Additionally, by tracking 
products through their respective production processes and across countries to their final export 
destination, value-added more accurately portrays which countries account for the final demand 
of exports (Logan 2013). 
Pertaining to trade in value added for China, much confusion exists regarding COEs  
(Chinese owned enterprises) that are located and operating in China versus FIEs (foreign 
invested enterprises) that have opened subsidiaries within China. Establishing an FIE is a 
common method of launching an operation in Asian countries, especially in China. While both 
types of firms may be situated in China and thus technically generate DVA for Chinese exports, 
there is one especially stark difference between COEs and FIEs: while China almost always 
benefits from the profits produced by COEs, it almost never benefits from the profits that FIEs 
create. In order to better understand this statement, let us visualize a pie chart, with the whole 
being equivalent to a firm’s total revenue. The full pie chart is a firm's total revenue.  After 
taking out material inputs, you are left with a rough approximation of "value-added.” The most 
important parts of value-added can be roughly divided into taxes for government, wages for 
labor and profits for owners of capital. Of these, taxes and wages generally stay in country, but 
as previously mentioned, profits likely differ between COEs and FIEs in terms of how they are 
used. FIEs are more likely to "repatriate" their profits back to their "home country" (let's say their 
headquarters is in Japan or the U.S., for example) or shift them to other parts of their business 
(let's say to build up their India operations, for example). By contrast, COEs are more likely to 
keep profits at home. Keep in mind this is not an absolute. FIEs might want to "re-invest" and 
grow in China and COEs might want to expand. However the owners of capital want to see their 
profits eventually, and presumably the owners of most COEs live in China and most FIEs live 
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abroad. So while China is home to much production and innovation, it is not actually retaining 
all of the earnings generated on its soil. Still, despite the fact that FIE firms in China often take 
their profits out of the country, they actually account for a far greater amount of “Chinese” DVA 
in its exports than COEs do. We will examine this fact in more detail later on. 
E. Domestic Value Added 
The domestic content of a country’s exports is often referred to as the “domestic value 
added” content of exports. In such cases, the value added of an exported good encompasses the 
good’s total value minus both direct and indirect imported inputs, and also includes all the 
domestic intermediate goods and services used for the production of the good (IDE-JETRO 
2015). The domestic content of any export will include the direct value added from the exporting 
industrial sector plus the value added from other domestic sectors that are indirectly embedded 
into the production process (IDE-JETRO 2015). 
China’s rather remarkable record of sustained growth has caused its developmental 
trajectory and contributing growth components to be scrutinized by both academics and 
policymakers alike. Hong Ma, Zhi Wang, and Kunfu Zhu (2013) examine China’s domestic 
value added by focusing on the difference between Chinese exports by foreign invested 
enterprises (FIEs) compared to Chinese exports by Chinese owned enterprise (COEs), in order to 
gain a better and more accurate sense of a measurement of DVA generated from China’s exports. 
Utilizing an accounting framework with a precise estimation method that takes into account both 
the production and trade activities for FIEs and COEs, the scholars’ preliminary results indicate 
that in 2007, FIEs functioning in China created almost half of Chinese DVA in Chinese exports 
while COEs only contributed less than 5%. Even more significant is the fact that foreign factory 
owners in Hong Kong and Taiwan, specifically, captured a little over half of the value of these 
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exports. The results of this text speak directly to the content of China’s exports, the topic of this 
thesis, which allows me make proper conclusions about various dynamics and trends pertaining 
to the changes in value added of its exports over time. In addition, its focus on the separation 
between FIEs and COEs creates an added layer of sophistication to my analysis of the content of 
China’s exports. 
Also related to the concept of domestic value added is Hiau Looi Kee and Heiwai Tang’s 
(2012) work that focuses on the DVA in China’s exports but at the granular firm and industry 
levels. The motivation behind this research stems from China’s export success, as the paper uses 
customs transaction and firm-level production data to ultimately conclude the following: There 
has been an increase in the domestic value added ratio (DAVR) in Chinese processing exports—
exports which utilize a disproportionally high percent of imported intermediates—which has thus 
led to an increase in the DAVR in overall exports. Kee and Tang (2012) assert that this increase 
is due to within-firm substitution of imported materials with domestic materials, which is largely 
driven by increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) that gives rise to domestic production of 
materials. This text effectively proves that DVA in China’s exports has indeed increased over 
time, which I have hypothesized. In addition, it elaborates on a potential reason as to why this 
increase has taken place, a topic that I will touch upon later on in this paper. Most importantly, 
Kee and Tang (2012) closely examine processing trade, which directly speaks to the trade 
imbalance that results from trade in value added measurement difficulties. Because processing 
trade presumably has low domestic content, any policy analysis based on aggregate statistics of 
gross trade flows could be highly misleading. 
F. China’s Gross Export Basket 
 It is no secret that over the past decade China’s exports have boomed. In fact, over the  
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past fifteen years they have jumped more than tenfold and as a result, China overtook Japan as 
the world’s third largest exporter in 2004. Pertaining to China’s exports, there are two generally 
acknowledged arguments in the scholarly world. The first is of a more technical nature, in that it 
is derived directly from the breakdown of trade. By focusing on the electronics market, trade 
analysts are able to uncover the true meaning behind thousands of imports and exports of both 
intermediate and final goods in and across China, East Asia, and the world. Because electronics 
products are assemblages of intermediate inputs imported into China from mostly other East 
Asian countries, conclusions of China’s technological capabilities should not, and cannot, be 
judged on its exports. The sophistication of these imports that come from other advanced 
countries must also be considered.  
 This idea goes against the arguments of various scholars, such as Dani Rodrik (2006), for 
example. Rodrik examines the significant question of “What’s So Special about China’s 
Exports?” Using an indicator that measures the productivity level accompanying a country’s 
export basket, along with data that includes over 5,000 products up to the 6-digit commodity 
level, Rodrik’s findings are numerous. First, Rodrik asserts that government policies have 
assisted in nurturing domestic capabilities in consumer electronics and other advanced areas that 
would most likely not have developed in their absence. Second, China has accomplished growth, 
improved education, health and more, using its own brand of experimental gradualism: 
increasing dependency on markets and price signals, yet doing so within the boundaries of highly 
unorthodox institutions (Rodrik 2006). Rodrik considers this term to be the unconventional way 
in which China has achieved global integration. Most importantly, he touches upon the 
significance of the success of China’s export industries—such as the consumer electronics 
industry—stating that it is actually unexpected for a country at China’s level of income to have 
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as sophisticated an “export basket” as it does. Rodrik asserts, based on the portfolio of China’s 
electronics exports, the country’s technological sophistication has grown very fast. He then 
builds upon this statement by ultimately asking: “Will China continue to latch onto higher-
income products over time?” This question will be considered in a later part of my thesis that 
addresses China’s future sustainability based on conclusions drawn from the evolution and 
visible, traceable trends within its electronics industry. However, it is important to note—Rodrik 
does not consider the existence of fragmented production, an implication that I deem essential to 
take into account when contemplating China’s technological proficiencies. That being said, to 
the degree that I am able to show that China’s DVA has increased over time, Rodrik’s argument 
and findings nicely dovetail with mine.  
G. Conclusion 
Turn over your iPhone, iPad, iPod or MacBook—along with many other types of 
electronics—and you will see the “Made in China” tag stamped across the back. As a result, 
there is a common misconception among the general population that everything coming out of 
China is actually produced there. In reality, China is actually the last stage of the East Asian 
production process. In order to further examine these East Asian trade and manufacturing 
networks, this thesis studies the evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of Chinese exports 
from 1995-2011, while specifically focusing on its electronics industry. Existing literature on the 
concepts of the Flying Geese Paradigm (FGP), East Asian regional nexus, vertical specialization, 
trade in value added, domestic value added and China’s gross export basket provide telling 
information and insight into the domestic value added (DVA) of China’s electronics industry, as 
well as the potential significance that this industry, and an increase in its DVA, holds for China’s 
future.  
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While a large portion of this thesis speaks to the importance of thinking about and 
measuring the world of trade in terms of Trade in Value Added (TiVA), it is also imperative to 
highlight that there are implications that exist as a result of thinking about the world in these 
terms. First, there is the question of how to measure not only the DVA or FVA in China’s gross 
exports, but also the sophistication level, a concept that we have previously examined in 
Rodrik’s work. He asserts that based on the portfolio of China’s electronics exports, the 
country’s technological sophistication has grown very fast. Thus, we ask: Is China rising through 
the international division of labor? Is it accelerating into the industries where our 
competitiveness lies? For example, once China starts really penetrating into technological 
frontiers, it becomes more of a direct threat to the leading East Asian countries, i.e. Japan. As 
mentioned previously, China’s electronics industry now makes up 24.4% of its gross export pie, 
which represents a definitive increase over time. This positive shift clearly shows that electronics 
exports have been a legitimate contentious point and may accurately be interpreted as an 
indication of China’s sophistication and potential manufacturing threat to advanced countries. In 
fact, a recent buzz has arisen amongst both academics and the public alike about China’s 
manufacturing capabilities. In May of 2015, the Economist published an article titled “Made in 
China,” which speaks to the rise of China’s electronics manufacturing sector: “In many 
industries China is still learning from the world, say the engineers, but its electronics 
manufacturing is so advanced that ‘the world is learning from China’” (The Economist 2015). 
Clearly, there is no question that China’s manufacturers have risen to become export 
powerhouses. Now, it is only a matter of time until its electronics industry truly becomes cutting 
edge within East Asia. 
An additional implication that exists as a result of thinking about the world in terms of  
	  	   21	  
TiVA is the widespread problem of trade imbalances that are a direct result of measuring the  
world of trade using two very different methods. To explain more clearly, let’s use the example 
of the U.S-China bilateral trade deficit that exists. In gross terms, an export from Japan that is 
only used in China and then exported from China to the United States, gets counted as a Chinese 
export instead of a Japanese export. In other words, whatever is imported into China goes into its 
gross imports and whatever is exported from China goes into its gross exports. As a result, the 
bilateral deficit that we have with China is overestimated since part of it is the result of Japanese 
goods inside Chinese exports. So, our deficit with Japan should actually be higher—based on this 
example—than it is with China. Clearly, bilateral value-added trade imbalances differ from gross 
trade imbalances, so not carefully differentiating between the two creates inaccurate bilateral 
trade deficit numbers, which thus generates a false image to the entire world of the trade 
relationship between the U.S, China and Japan.  
I will continue to expand upon the evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of 
Chinese exports, from 1995-2011, in the following section by examining the analytical 
framework of this paper.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
As this thesis aims to study the evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of Chinese 
exports from 1995-2011, while specifically focusing on its electronics industry, it is essential to 
first understand the context of this phenomenon of extraordinary growth that we are examining 
within China. Section A will focus on China as a whole, by initially providing a general context 
for this recent growth, and afterwards looking specifically at various reforms and 
macroeconomic indicators that have taken place. Section B will draw upon China’s export 
performance, first at a macro level and then zeroing in on its electronics industry specifically in 
section C. Section D will address domestic value added (DVA) and section E foreign value 
added (FVA), both explaining what these concepts entail and what can be derived by looking at 
China’s DVA and FVA numbers within its electronics industry. The conclusion will further 
explain what I am going to do with this analytical framework; what sort of data I am going to use 
in chapter IV; and from where this data has been extracted. 
A. Introduction: China and its Enormous Growth 
The “Made in China” label imprinted on the back of our Apple iPhone, let’s say, speaks 
to the generally believed notion that this sophisticated device is coming entirely from China. 
However, when taken apart, the iPhone—a marvel of design, functionality, and engineering—
consists of bits and pieces made in a variety of countries. Clearly, China is not doing all of the 
manufacturing. Take the high-tech, highly valued smartphone processor, or likewise, the tiny 
camera piece that sits on front of an iPhone, for example. This camera is being produced in a 
place like Japan, for the companies there have the greatest strengths in the relevant technologies 
concerning that camera. Then, when all of the iPhone’s relevant intermediate goods are imported 
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back to China, assembled and ultimately exported as a final product from China, it appears that 
this sophisticated device is coming entirely from China. Someone, somewhere, might ask: So 
what? 
 We are examining this phenomenon in the context of a country that, subsequent to its 
economic reforms over two decades ago, has undergone enormous changes. One of the most 
spectacular is its recent experience of high growth rates. This massive success stems from the 
initiation of market reforms in 1978, which shifted China from a centrally planned to a market 
based economy—in other words, from a socialist to a more capitalist type of economic system. 
As a result, the country has experienced rapid social and economic development. Now, with a 
population of around 1.35 billion people, China has recently become the second largest economy 
in the world and its role in the global arena has become more important and influential. GDP 
growth averages about 10 percent a year, which has lifted more than 500 million people out of 
poverty (The World Bank 2015).   
 Nonetheless, China still remains a developing country, as its per capita income is still 
significantly less than those of advanced countries. Its market reforms are incomplete and official 
data show that approximately 98.99 million people in China lived below the national poverty line 
at the end of 2012 (The World Bank 2015). Clearly, poverty reduction remains a fundamental 
challenge as China contains the second largest number of poor people in the world after India. In 
addition, challenges such as high inequality, rapid urbanization, external imbalances and 
problems regarding environmental sustainability have been brought about due to the rapid 
economic ascendance that has recently taken place (The World Bank 2015). Furthermore, its 
aging population and internal migration of labor have created demographic pressures.   
In order for China’s growth to be sustainable and its challenges properly handled,  
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significant policy adjustments are required. Its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) effectively and 
forcefully addresses these issues. It focuses on the “development of services and measures to 
address environmental and social imbalances, setting targets to reduce pollution, to increase 
energy efficiency, to improve access to education and healthcare, and to expand social 
protection” (The World Bank 2015). Instead of focusing on pace of growth, China has the 
intention to focus on quality of life, as its annual growth target of 7 percent indicates (The World 
Bank 2015). 
Additionally, let us further flesh out the context of China’s extraordinary growth by 
analyzing the country in terms of some World Development Indicators provided by the World 
Bank database. Starting with Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the broadest measure of a 
country’s economy, we see that China’s GDP growth has actually decreased and begun to level  
 
Figure 3.1 — China’s Real GDP Growth 
 
    Source: Data compiled from http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
off in recent years. In 2011, it had a real GDP growth rate of 9.5%. However, it then decreased in 
2012, 2013, and 2014, falling to 7.8%, 7.7%, and 7.3% respectively (WDI 2015). The World 
Bank estimated that China’s GDP will continue to fall in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, down to 
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6.9%, 6.7%, 6.5% and 6.5% respectively (WDI 2015). The decrease in China’s real GDP growth 
is shown in figure 3.1 above, which includes its estimated forecasts for the future as well as the 
Developing East Asia and Pacific region’s real GDP projections. 
Regarding unemployment rate, a measure of the number of people actively looking for a 
job as a percentage of the labor force, China’s remained unchanged at 4.05% in the fourth 
quarter of 2015 from 4.05% in the third quarter of 2015. Between 2002 and 2015, China’s 
unemployment rate averaged 4.13% (WDI 2015). Figure 3.2 below displays this information. In 
2007, there is a sharp drop in unemployment rate to 3.75%, though it quickly rebounds in 
 
Figure 3.2 — China’s Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: Data compiled from http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
2008 before falling again. Unemployment rate in China is reported by the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China. 
Lastly, China’s interest rate has been steadily declining in recent years as the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC) has continued to cut rates in order to combat a slowing economy and 
deflationary pressures. Figure 3.3 below displays the very tumultuous numbers that China’s 
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interest rate has undergone, as it reached a height of 7.5% in 2008, only to decline to around 
5.25% by 2010 (WDI 2015). We also see that it often plateaus for a select period of time before 
increasing or decreasing. This pattern often illustrates the state of a steady economy, until it is 
decided that times are either good or bad, which then results in the increase or decrease of  
 
Figure 3.3 — China’s Interest Rate 
 
    Source: Data compiled from http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
 
interest rates. With the decline of interest rates around 2015, and a historic period of lows very 
recently, China’s central bank has taken action. It injected CNY 100 billion (USD 15.2 billion) 
into the financial system on February 2nd 2016 and increased the frequency of open market 
operations between January 29th and February 19th in order to help maintain liquidity and 
stimulate its sluggish economy (WDI 2015). 
 We have now fleshed out more of the context behind China’s recent extreme growth. 
Subsequent to its economic reforms over two decades ago, the country has clearly undergone 
enormous changes, including the experiencing of extraordinarily high growth rates. By 
examining various macroeconomic indicators, such as real GDP growth, unemployment rate and 
interest rate, we gain a more well rounded understanding of China, the health of its economy and 
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its overall state, in hopes that this knowledge will enable clearer insight into its export boom, and 
hence, incredible growth. 
However, it is important to note that there are limits to growth within the type of 
production system that China is integrated into. How are the recent patterns of these indicators 
suggestive of not only the production system that China is integrated into, but also what others 
are saying about China’s declining growth rates? Because this thesis is focused on the evolution, 
dynamics, and trends of the content of China’s exports—especially within its electronics 
industry—I want to reiterate a point mentioned previously in the abstract: the DVA of exports in 
China’s electronics industry appears to have somewhat leveled off since 2008. In the 1990’s and 
early 2000’s, China’s DVA was steadily increasing within its trade industries. Yet now, it seems 
to have leveled off at the same time that its growth has begun to decline. This suggested 
correlation will be further examined and analyzed in subsequent chapters. 
In the next section, China’s overall export performance will first be put into perspective, 
followed by its performance in the electronics industry specifically. This will appropriately lead 
into a discussion of DVA and FVA, which will bring us full circle back to the example of 
Apple’s iPod and its relevance to both China and this thesis.  
B. China’s Export Performance  
Within the past decade, China has experienced an export boom. Its exports have rapidly 
increased, inducing extraordinary growth rates, which as a result, have shifted all eyes to China 
as spectators within the global arena wonder what is next for this powerhouse. Since the end of 
the 1970s, the Chinese economy has been expanding dramatically, as the increase of China’s 
participation in international trade has certainly been one of the most outstanding features of this 
economic development. In fact, Chinese exports have increased far more rapidly than the 
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country’s GDP growth. Its exports rose, on average, 5.7% in the 1980s, 12.4% in the 1990s, and 
a whopping 20.3% between 2000 and 2003 (Silva-Ruete 2006). By 2003, its export growth rate 
was seven times larger than the export growth rate recorded by the world as a whole (Silva-Ruete 
2006).  
 The trade boom that China has experienced in the last two decades speaks to its increased 
participation in the world’s main export markets. Chinese exports have grown from US$25 
billion in 1984 to US$383 billion in 2003, which represents a jump from 1.5% to 5.8% in its 
share in world exports (Silva-Ruete 2006). This export growth is due to highly dynamic and 
diversified export activity. In 1987, approximately a quarter of China’s exports were classified as 
products that were in high demand globally, yet by 2002, this number had risen to 60%, which is 
the same proportion as that logged by the United States’ exports (Silva-Ruete 2006). 
Furthermore, export concentration indicators suggest that not only is China’s export supply 
highly diverse compared to that of other countries, but its technological component is also 
increasing. These findings associate with the conclusions made by Rodrik that were discussed 
previously. To reiterate, he states that is it is actually unexpected for a country at China’s level of 
income to have as sophisticated of an “export basket” as it does. Thus, based on the diverse and 
sophisticated portfolio of China’s electronics exports, the country’s technological sophistication 
has grown very fast (Rodrik 2006). The gradual shifting of its exports from fairly simple 
manufactured goods towards more sophisticated products is shown in the following numbers: in 
1985, close to 90% of Chinese exports consisted of either primary products or manufactured 
items that were based on low technology or natural items; by 2002, this figure had fallen to 50%, 
as the percentage of high-tech exports rose from less than 5% to above 30% in the same period 
(Silva-Ruete 2006).  It comes as no surprise that, despite beginning in low-value, labor-intensive 
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sectors such as apparel and footwear, China’s export portfolio has now moved, with the help of 
outsourcing, specialization, and trade in value added, into greater value, higher productivity 
channels such as computers and electronics. 
C. China’s Performance in Electronics 
Now that China’s general export performance has been put into perspective, let us turn to 
China’s performance in the electronics sector, which is the focus of this paper. As mentioned 
above, the export configuration of China’s real export growth has changed drastically since 
1995. Growing export shares in electronics and machinery— products of sophistication and 
specialization—countered the decline in agriculture and apparel. In 2004, China overtook the 
United States to become the world’s leading exporter of information and communications 
technology (ICT) goods such as mobile phones, laptop computers and digital cameras (OECD 
2005). One year earlier, in 2003, the U.S. led with exports of ICT goods worth USD 137 billion, 
followed by China with USD 123 billion. However, in 2004, China’s number increased to USD 
180 billion worth of exported ICT goods, compared with U.S. exports in the same category 
valued at USD 149 billion (OECD 2005). The data show a shift towards greater trade between 
China and other Asian countries, with a corresponding decline in ICT imports from the European 
Union and United States. Previously China relied on electronic components, such as computer 
chips, that were imported from the U.S. and EU to manufacture advanced mobile phones and 
laptops. Now these components are being increasingly sourced from other Asian countries such 
as Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and Malaysia. These facts speak to the significance of 
regionalization and China’s location within the dynamic, diverse East Asian regional nexus. 
Furthermore, China is manufacturing and exporting more electronic components than ever 
before, as they now form China’s second largest export item after computers and related  
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equipment (OECD 2005).  
More specifically, this paper’s empirical focus is on the electronics sector characterized 
by OECD as: “C30T33X: Computer, Electronic and optical equipment.” This industry is a sub-
sector of “C30T33: Electrical and optical equipment.” The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO) created a joint 
initiative to address the issue regarding Trade in Value Added (TiVA)—the fact that flows of 
goods and services within global production chains are not always reflected in conventional 
measures of international trade—by considering the value added by each country in the 
production of goods and services that are consumed worldwide (OECD 2016). This C30T33X 
industry—Computer, Electronic and optical equipment—is just one of many industries included 
in the 2015 edition of the TiVA database, which covers over 34 unique industrial sectors, 
including 16 manufacturing and 14 services sectors. 
Using trade data specifically from industry C30T33X, figure 3.4 below shows that  
China’s gross exports within this sector have skyrocketed since 1995. While they equated to  
 
Figure 3.4 — China’s Gross Exports: Electronics Industry (C30T33X: Computer, 
Electronic and optical equipment) 
 
         Source: Data compiled from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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around USD 143 million in 1995, the worth of these exports increased to USD 468 million by 
2011. To additionally show the growing significance of the electronics industry within China’s 
gross export basket, let us examine the table below, which shows three different commodity 
groups, along with the sum of trade value in USD and the percentage of gross exports from  
 
Table 3.5 — Chinese Export Data 
Product Description Sum of Trade Value in USD 
(1996-2013) 
% of gross exports from China 
Electrical mchy equip parts 
thereof… 
$3.68 billion 23.12% 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, 
mchy… 
$2.90 billion 18.23% 
Art of apparel & clothing 
access… 
$.7 billion 4.49% 
Source: Data compiled from http://wits.wordldbank.org 
 
 
China for each group. Table 3.5 uses Chinese export data pulled from the WITS trade database, 
and shows the product group of electrical equipment parts—a subset of the entire electronics 
market—to be China’s largest source of gross exports. Ranked in order from first to third, we see 
that the commodity group of electrical equipment parts (23.12%) makes up China’s greatest 
gross exported product group. Since 2000, exports of electrical parts have increased from trade 
values of $46.067 billion in 2000 to $562.308 billion in 2013 (WITS 2015). 
 By examining both OECD and WITS trade data, it is very clear that the electronics 
industry has become a significant part of China’s trade portfolio. Its export basket, while once 
largely consisting of low-value, labor-intensive sectors such as apparel and footwear, has now 
moved into sectors of greater value and higher productivity such as computers and electronics.  
The next section will address the concept of DVA, an essential component to this paper as well 
as in the larger picture of China’s export growth. 
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D. Domestic Value Added (DVA)  
 As previously discussed, the phenomenon of vertical specialization, and stemming from 
that, trade in value added—which accounts for value-added contributions in exports from various 
domestic industries and various foreign industries—is especially significant to China’s 
electronics industry. Domestic value added (DVA) in gross exports is an estimation of value 
added, by an economy, in producing services for export. This measure is a percentage share of 
value (OECD 2016). 
WTO and IDE-JETRO (2011) state that the addressing of DVA incorporated in exported 
goods can—inter alia—help economies in the following multiple ways: identify the sources of 
international competitiveness and comparative advantages and to better reflect the actual 
contribution of the various industrial sectors in the production process of its exported goods; to 
evaluate the actual impact of foreign trade on economic growth and employment; and to provide 
another angle for the examination of bilateral trade balances or regional transactions. 
The OECD-WTO joint initiative on TiVA does an exceptional job at providing all the 
necessary information, sources and materials so that the TiVA database is easily accessible and 
navigable to the average person. For example, a TiVA indicator codebook provides definitions 
for each indicator in the database, along with interpretation directions, equations, notes and 
more. Since the empirical focus of this paper is on domestic value added within China’s 
electronics industry, the codebook can be utilized to gain a better understanding of what exactly 
one of our primary indicators—“EXGR_DVA: Domestic value added content of gross 
exports”—means. OECD defines this indicator as follows: “Domestic value added content of 
gross exports includes the value added generated by the exporting industry during its production 
processes as well as any value added coming from upstream domestic suppliers that is embodied 
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in the exports (OECD 2015).” Furthermore, domestic value added content of gross exports is 
calculated using the equation below: 
 
EXGR_DVAc,p,i = VcBc,cEXGRc,p,i 
 
In this case, EXGRc,p,i is a Kx1 vector with all entries equal to zero except the one corresponding 
to industry i. Little “c,p,i” stands for country, partner country, and industry, respectively. All 
gross trade measures are in USD millions at current prices with a basic price valuation. 
 The DVA trade data — extracted from the OECD database — will be further analyzed 
for China’s electronics industry in Chapter IV. This will give us better insight into exact 
numbers, patterns and what this all may mean relative to China, the content of its electronics 
exports, and its future sustainability in the global arena. Let us now address the concept of FVA. 
E.  Foreign Value Added (FVA) 
Similar to DVA, foreign value added (FVA) is an integral component of value added 
trade statistics. At the country level, foreign value added in exports indicates what part of the 
country’s gross exports consist of inputs that have been produced by other countries, or the 
extent to which a country’s exports are dependent on imported content (UNCTAD 2013). At the 
industry level, the average foreign value added is actually a proxy for the extent to which 
industry value chains are segmented into distinct tasks and activities that generate trade, 
compounding the double counting effect (UNCTAD 2013). 
We have previously discussed the complications surrounding the quantification of the 
world of trade, i.e. the difference of measurement in gross versus net terms. To reiterate: Raw 
material extracted from one country may be exported first to a second country to be processed 
and then exported again to a manufacturing plant in a third country, until it is finally exported to 
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a fourth country for final processing and consumption. While the value of the raw material 
counts only once as a GDP contribution in the original country, it is counted several times in 
world exports, thus the notion of “double counting.” So, in terms of China’s foreign value 
added—although China was the world’s biggest exporter of electronic goods in 2009, almost 
40% of its $467 billion-worth of exports were first imported (The Economist 2013). In other 
words, the exports require a lot of imports, which resulted in the production of electronic 
products with large shares of FVA. Furthermore, because the electronics industry consists largely 
of goods that can be broken down into discrete components and then separately produced, easily 
transported, and assembled in low-cost locations, it has consequently been ranked one of the 
highest industries in share of foreign value added in trade (UNCTAD 2013). 
The rise of “global manufacturing” and increased vertical integration have undoubtedly 
led to significant changes in trade patterns throughout the world. At the global level, the average 
foreign value added in exports is approximately 28% (UNCTAD 2013). This means that, 
roughly, around $5 trillion of the $19 trillion in 2010 world exports of goods and services has 
been contributed by foreign countries for further exports and is thus “double counted” in global 
trade figures. The remaining $14 trillion is the actual value added contribution of trade to the 
global economy (UNCTAD 2013). 
The OECD-WTO joint initiative on TiVA includes “foreign value added content of gross 
exports” as one of its indicators. I will be examining this, along with “domestic value added 
content of gross exports,” in this thesis. The TiVA indicator codebook states that “foreign value 
added content of gross exports captures the value of imported intermediate goods and services 
that are embodied in a domestic industry’s exports. The value added can come from any foreign 
industry upstream in the production chain” (OECD 2015). Foreign value added content of gross  
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exports can be calculated using the equation below: 
 
XGR_FVAc = V B(c),cEXGRc,i 
 
Here, B(c),c is the column block of B corresponding to country c, with the row block 
corresponding to c being zero. Similar to DVA, FVA is measured in USD millions. 
 Chapter IV will examine the extracted OECD data that will display DVA, FVA, and 
gross export numbers and patterns for China’s electronics industry over the time period of 1995-
2011. From that, we will be able to better analyze increases and decreases across the industry in 
terms of DVA and FVA, and what these results may mean for China’s future growth and 
sustainability. 
F. Conclusion 
 An analytical framework for the context of this phenomenon of extraordinary growth that 
we are examining within China has now been developed. This framework is necessary to further 
understand the evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of Chinese exports from 1995-
2011, especially within its electronics industry. To properly establish this framework, we 
commence by providing a general context for this recent growth. Using the example of Apple’s 
iPod to set the stage, we examine—subsequent to its economic reforms over two decades ago—
China’s rapid social and economic development. To further flesh out China’s extraordinary 
growth, we then analyze the country in terms of various macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, 
unemployment rate and interest rate. A pattern of decline or stagnation across each of these 
indicators is seen, which brings us to an important point—there are limits to growth within the  
type of production system that China is integrated into.  
This analytical framework is further built upon as China’s export performance is  
	  	   36	  
evaluated. At a macro level, it is very clear that China has experienced an export boom. China’s 
increased participation in international trade has certainly been one of the most outstanding 
features of its economic development, as its exports have increased far more rapidly than the 
country’s GDP growth. In addition, China’s increased participation in the world’s main export 
markets has enabled its export portfolio to move, with the help of outsourcing, specialization, 
and trade in value added, into greater value, higher productivity channels such as computers and 
electronics. Regarding the performance of China’s electronics industry, it is very clear that this 
sector has become increasingly significant within its absolute export basket. Electronics exports 
have skyrocketed since 1995 and as a result, China has since overtaken the U.S. to become the 
world’s leading exporter of information and communications technology (ICT) goods such as 
mobile phones, laptop computers and digital cameras (OECD 2005). One of the central questions 
of this thesis is what can be interpreted from the massive success of China’s electronics industry 
specifically, since much can be said in terms of sophisticated technology, innovation, and know-
how in regards to future sustainability. Finally, after briefly addressing DVA and FVA—how 
these concepts are defined, calculated, and the significance of each in the world of trade—our 
analytical framework has been completed.  
In chapter IV, we will analyze extensive data that has been extracted from both the 
OECD and WDI databases. This data will include China’s FVA content of gross exports; DVA 
content of gross exports and DVA share of gross exports within not only China’s electronics 
industry but across other industries as well; GDP per capita for many countries throughout the 
world; and more. In using a wealth of data from multiple databases, across numerous industries, 
and throughout multiple regions, this thesis will aim to produce extensive breadth and depth to 
the examination of the evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of Chinese Exports from  
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1995-2011. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA AND RESULTS 
 
Chapter IV will present the data and empirical results for this study. Section A introduces 
the data utilized in this thesis and justifies the decision to conduct a cross region comparison in 
order to better understand both China and its position within the East Asian region. Section B 
defines and further explains the three measures—average, standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation—that are each used to characterize the trade data. Next, section C will conduct a 
regional comparison of East Asia and Europe, with the intention of ultimately showing how East 
Asia is distinct from Europe. In section D, the previously examined data on East Asia will be 
used to better locate China’s role within the larger East Asian region. Our focus here will be on 
China specifically. Then, we will turn to Section E, which takes a look at the World 
Development Indicator (WDI) data—GDP per capita—in order to assess levels of development 
within the East Asian and European regions. Stemming from this, theories of international trade 
will be applied to better tell the story of why we might see the patterns and results that we do. 
Finally, chapter IV will come full circle in section F, as we return to the larger question of the 
“leveling off phenomenon” that China’s electronics industry has seemed to hit in terms of DVA 
in its exports. Here the possibilities as to why this plateauing has occurred and what it may mean 
for China’s future sustainability are examined. Section G will conclude the chapter.  
A. Introduction to Data 
 Although China is the focal point of this thesis, the examination of this country alone is 
not sufficient. In order to thoroughly understand the bigger picture, a regional cross-examination 
between East Asia—the larger regional system in which China is a part of—and Europe—the 
other highly regionalized center in the world—is necessary. From this, we can better assess what 
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makes East Asia distinct from Europe, in order to ultimately categorize China’s role within the 
East Asian region. We will then have the grounds to assess if China alone is as strong as it 
appears to be in manufacturing and exports, or if its rise is heavily dependent on the success of 
the surrounding East Asian region, such that China’s regional integration has driven its growth. 
If so, then many explanations of China’s success may be undercut, such as strong state guidance, 
judicious government policy, and more. This is a question of China’s individual strength, or 
instead of East Asia’s regionalized nature.  
In terms of this thesis, the countries that constitute East Asia (defined as EA within the 
data frame) are Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Chinese 
Taipei, Thailand, Vietnam, and, of course, China. These are largely the same economies that 
have contributed to the East Asian growth phenomenon. The data frame categorizes the 
European region (defined as EU) to include the following 25 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, Romania, Russia, Greece and Bulgaria. Just to clarify—Israel has been 
included as a part of the European region because of proximity and the fact that it has an 
important high-tech sector. EU and EA only incorporate the largest, most significant countries of 
the region; the smaller countries that do not add much—such as Cambodia in East Asia, for 
example—have been left out for the purpose of simplicity and effectiveness in painting an 
accurate image of each region.  
 By comparing the regions of East Asia and Europe, I aim to determine whether or not 
there really is something unique about the East Asian region. More specifically, this conclusion 
will enable us to examine if China’s extraordinary growth is due to its inclusion within East 
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Asia, or if it is simply from China’s own internal capabilities and strengths, such as its large 
domestic markets, rich resources, authoritarian government or judicious policy choices — all 
common alternative explanations of Chinese growth.  
B. Providing Clarity: Average, Standard Deviation, Coefficient of Variation 
  In order to properly compare East Asia and Europe, I developed new measures that will 
enable effective regional cross comparison and ultimately allow China to be placed within the 
larger East Asian system. This thesis will use the domestic value added (DVA) content of gross 
exports indicator—from OECD’s TiVA database—to calculate both average (AVG) and 
standard deviation (SD) of the DVA of exports for each region in numerous industries. 
 For this thesis, the AVG that will be shown in tables and graphs is the average of DVA of 
exports in the select industry. So, in terms of our regional cross comparison—the “average” 
number shown per year for each region is the calculated total mean of DVA in the selected 
industry’s exports across all the countries within the chosen region. As for standard deviation, if 
a region is said to have a “high SD,” then this means that some countries’ exports are very high 
in DVA, while other countries in the region export goods with very little DVA. It also signifies 
that the countries within that region have very heterogeneous economies and unequal production 
systems relative to each other. Quite simply, there is a lot of variation in the manufacturing that 
each country is performing. On the other hand, if a region has a “low SD” this means that the 
countries share a more common level of DVA in their exports. This would signify that countries 
within that region are more homogenous — their economies are on a similar level, they are 
trading and interacting with each other, and, as a whole, their production systems are largely 
equivalent.  
Let us now take these two measures and our understanding of them, and tell a narrative of  
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how they can be applied to the data used in this thesis. This story will put meaning behind the 
data so that the statistics represent more than just numbers. Figure 4.1 below will illustrate the 
description being told. This model begins with “average of DVA of exports” as our top node and 
  
Figure 4.1 — Diagram of Average and Standard Deviation Breakdown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
further breaks this category down into numerous branches and sublevels of “average” and 
“standard deviation” measures. Each branch is created based on a level of “high” or “low.” In 
order to best illustrate this image, stark examples of select regions, countries, and (imaginary) 
numbers will be used. However, the exact data tables and numbers will be displayed and  
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examined in a later section within this thesis. Figure 4.1 above shows the diagram that we will 
now explain in greater detail. 
Let us begin with the average of DVA of exports as our first node. Again, this is a 
measure of the average DVA of exports of all the countries within the select region—either East 
Asia or Europe, in this case. This node is then split into two sub levels or categories—one is 
defined by a “high” average DVA of exports and the other by “low” average of DVA of exports. 
Based on our data below, Europe (EU) defines the “high average DVA” subcategory in that it 
has a higher average of DVA than does East Asia (EA) in four of the six industries that this 
thesis examines. Therefore, let us pretend EU has an average of, say, 70% DVA in a particular 
industry —this is considered to be “high.” A greater DVA signifies less foreign value added 
(FVA). Figure 4.1 shows this DVA/FVA breakdown in terms of a rectangle bar that symbolizes 
the absolute value added for the region—in other words, the sum of DVA and FVA. In this 
diagram, we see that the larger part of the displayed bar consists of DVA share (70%) and the 
smaller part of FVA share (30%). Less FVA most likely signifies that the region is less tightly 
networked in terms of trading goods that contribute to the production of a final product. In other 
words, the industries of the countries within the European region are more separate than those in 
the East Asian region. 
On the other hand, the “low” subcategory of average of DVA of exports—let’s pretend 
30% DVA within the industry—can be largely defined by EA. The fact that the East Asian 
region has lower average DVA numbers than Europe in a majority of the examined industries 
means that it has greater FVA. In figure 4.1 above, we see this breakdown again in the rectangle 
bars that display a 30% share of DVA and a 70% share of FVA, the later of which is greater than 
the FVA of EU in the “high average DVA” category. Greater FVA indicates that another country 
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(most likely in the same region) is doing a large portion of the work or adding value in the 
production of a good. Therefore, it can be assumed that the countries within the East Asian 
network are more networked than those in Europe, since each country is adding to another’s 
FVA within the region. It can be concluded, therefore, that the industries of the eleven countries 
that compose EA in this paper are all incredibly interconnected, which helps to explain the 
strength of the East Asian region. Furthermore, this facet has certainly enabled the tremendous 
growth seen in China— especially in its electronics industry—as it is a part of this larger 
regionalized system. The role of regionalism is without a doubt crucial to Chinese development 
and potentially the key to its success. This point will be further elaborated upon in a later section 
that focuses specifically on China within the East Asian region. 
Now, let us further split up figure 4.1 into “high” and low” standard deviation sub groups. 
The “high average DVA” category can be split into these two sub levels of standard deviation 
and the “low average DVA” category can be split into the same two sub levels of standard 
deviation. This breakdown is shown in figure 4.1. A circle represents a country within that 
region. The following explanation of what “high standard deviation” and “low standard 
deviation” entail can be applied to both the “high average DVA” and “low average DVA” 
categories. For this purpose, let us take the “high average DVA” category—the one defined by 
Europe (EU) at 70% DVA—and split it into a high and a low level of standard deviation. The 
“high SD” level signifies more variance in the data, such that the countries within the region 
have unequal economies and production systems. As a result, there are countries with high levels 
of DVA (say 95%) that exist far apart from other countries with low levels of DVA (say 45%). 
Very rich, advanced countries exist, while poor, less developed ones do as well. For example, 
take Japan and Malaysia in East Asia. Malaysia may be relatively abundant in certain resources, 
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while Japan certainly excels at more specialized, advanced tasks. Furthermore, the economies of 
these two countries are certainly not equal.  
On the other hand, a region with a “low SD” consists of countries with largely equal 
economies that are much more similar to one another. They are likely located closer together and 
share similar levels of DVA. For example, in figure 4.1 we see that one country in a “low SD” 
region may have an average DVA of 75% while another may have one of 65%. In both cases, the 
average DVA centers around 70%, but there the former has high variance and the later has low 
variance.  Most importantly, a more equivalent production system exists—so, countries of equal 
importance are trading with one another and contributing around the same amounts. For 
example, France and Germany within the European region are not identical but certainly very 
similar in terms of equal economies and production systems. France may specialize in one 
pharmaceutical product, for instance, and Germany in another kind. These same explanations for 
“high SD” and “low SD” can be applied to our “low average DVA” (and thus large FVA) 
category shown in figure 4.1. Here, if a region has a “high SD,” then some countries have high 
average DVA (say 55%) and some have low average DVA (say 5%). In this case, the latter is 
likely doing simple production processes that generate little DVA before the product is exported 
again. If the region has a “low SD,” the countries are likely similar to each other in terms of their 
economies and production systems, and are highly networked.  
Finally, let us turn to a statistic called “coefficient of variation” (CV). CV—also known 
as relative standard deviation (RSD)—is a standardized measure of dispersion of a distribution. 
In terms of this thesis, it helps us get a sense of the scale of standard deviation within a specific 
industry of a select region. This thesis examines coefficient of variation so that both the 
calculated average and standard deviation numbers within the industry data can be incorporated 
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into one measure. This single measure then enables us to better make sense of what story the data 
is telling about the European (EU) and East Asian (EA) regions.  
 In order to calculate CV, divide the SD in the numerator by the average in the 
denominator, and multiply by 100. Figure 4.2 below shows this CV equation. One can see from 
 
Figure 4.2 — Coefficient of Variation Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
this equation that CV scales the average. Thus, a greater average denotes a smaller SD; a smaller 
average denotes a larger SD. This correlation is shown in the table below. From our OECD/WDI 
data, we have extracted—for both the European and East Asian regions—standard 
  
Table 4.3 — Calculated CV in both EU and EA’s electronics’ industry (1995) 
1995 Average (DVA) SD CV 
Europe (EU) 65.63 11.99 18.27% 
East Asia (EA) 55.75 17.19 30.80% 
Source: Data compiled from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
 
deviation and average numbers from both regions’ electronics industry. The CV has been 
calculated using the equation above. As seen in table 4.3, EU has an average (of DVA of its 
electronics industry exports in 1995) of 65.63. It has a SD of 11.99. Visibly, this is a relatively 
large average number for a rather small SD. On the other hand, EA has an average (of DVA in 
its electronics industry in 1995) of 55.75% and a SD of 17.19. This is a relatively small average 
number for quite a large SD. So, what can be concluded from these calculated CV measures? 
Because the coefficient of variation represents the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, it 
 
CV =   Standard Deviation (SD)   x100 
Average 
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is useful in comparing the degree of variation, or measure of dispersion, between East Asia and 
Europe. We see that the CV for EU is 18.27% and the CV for EA is 30.80%. The gap between 
these two coefficients shows us that the scale of SD within EA is much greater than in EU. For 
East Asia, having a relatively small DVA but a large SD in its electronics industry speaks to the 
great amount of heterogeneity we see within the region. On the other hand, for Europe, having a 
relatively large DVA but a small SD in its electronics industry speaks to the more homogenous 
nature of the region. So, the coefficient of variation, even relative to the difference in regional 
averages, reinforces the gap between SD that we see between EA and EU. 
In the next section, we will conduct a regional cross comparison of East Asia and Europe 
based on the measures of average, standard deviation and coefficient of variation that were 
discussed in this section. Section C will aim to tell the story of how the East Asian and European 
regions differ from one another, while specifically showing in what ways East Asia is distinctive. 
This feature is especially important, for it will provide a telling backdrop for us to fit China into 
in section D.  
C. Regional Cross Comparison: East Asia and Europe 
 Before a cross comparison of the European and East Asian regions based on the numbers 
from the measures discussed in section B is conducted, it is essential to first define which 
specific industries—in addition to electronics—this thesis examines. Below, table 4.4 lists each  
 
Table 4.4 — Selected Industries 
1 C30T33X Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 
2 C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
3 C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
4 C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
5 C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
6 C25 Rubber and plastics products 
Source: Data compiled from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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industry, as well as its C-code which is used to categorize the industrial sector within the OECD 
database. It is important to note that industries were selected because each is considered to be 
“manufacturing” (instead of “agriculture” or “services,” for example). Manufacturing processes 
are more easily broken up into sub-assemblies that can be traded. Furthermore, these industries 
cross a variety of technology levels: The food products and textiles industries are at the low end, 
while motor vehicles and electronics are at the high end. For each industrial sector, the following 
information was selected from the TiVA database: ‘Indicator’—Domestic value added share of 
gross exports; ‘Partner’—World; and ‘Time’—1995, 2000, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011. As a 
result, the database generated six Excel spreadsheets—one per industry—that each contain the 
percentage share of DVA of gross exports, for the 61 countries that OECD classifies as ‘World’, 
across all of the seven years. It is from this data that the average and standard deviation measures 
are calculated. 
 Now let us look at the averages and standard deviations of EU and EA within each 
industry and see how this information compares across regions. Figure 4.5 shows which 
region— EU or EA—has the larger AVG DVA and larger SD in the industry. The two stars seen 
next to some of the numbers denote which region has the larger measure. Immediately, some  
 
Table 4.5 — Region with the Greater AVG and SD in Each Industry 
Industry AVG SD 
EU EA EU EA 
C30T33X Electronics 63.08** 54.53 14.24 17.86** 
C17T19 Textiles 70.20** 66.84 13.04** 9.62 
C21T22 Pulp, Paper 74.95** 69.19 7.69 12.86** 
C34 Motor Vehicles 57.71 61.37** 11.80 14.36** 
C15T16 Food Products 74.66 75.98** 7.11 12.48** 
C25 Rubber, Plastic Products 66.76** 66.01 8.01 12.01** 
** Denotes the larger value 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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telling patterns stand out. For example, in four of the six industries, EU has a larger AVG of 
DVA of exports than does EA. For that reason, four out of the six values listed under EU have 
two stars next to them. In the two industries—motor vehicles and food products—where EA has 
a higher AVG of DVA than EU, the difference between regions is minor. Conversely, in five out 
of the six industries, EA has a greater SD than EU. What exactly do these trends mean?  
 Clearly, there are stark differences between the European and East Asian regions. Based 
on this industry-level trade data, it can be concluded that there is far less variance in Europe than 
there is in East Asia; yet there is far greater average DVA in exports in Europe than there is in 
East Asia. In terms of SD, the East Asian regional network consists of countries whose 
economies are ordered in a hierarchical way — for example, Japan has an 82% DVA in its 
electronics industry, while Malaysia only has 33% DVA. This heterogeneity correlates with a 
greater variance in that these countries have economies, production systems, and levels of 
development that are all on very different scales from one another. On the contrary, the European 
region consists of countries that lie in a tighter band — for example, Germany has 75% DVA in 
its electronics industry, while Romania, an Eastern European country, has 83% DVA. Despite 
the large gap between their levels of development, the share of DVA in these two countries is 
certainly on a more similar level than Japan and Malaysia in East Asia. Europe’s homogeneity 
correlates with a lower SD in its variance, and thus more similarity amongst countries in terms of 
their economies, production systems, and levels of development. 
Regarding the average measure, EU has a greater overall average of DVA than EA. The 
amount of DVA within a region is associated with level of interconnection. As previously 
mentioned, some regions are certainly more networked than others. This characteristic carries 
over to industries as well—different industries have different levels of being networked. For 
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example, of the six industries that this thesis inspects, both Europe and East Asia have its 
greatest average of DVA of exports in the food product industry. This makes sense—these 
countries are very capable of growing and processing their own food, which results in less 
sharing among countries in terms of needing one another to produce food products for export. 
Because there is less importing, exporting and interaction over all, there is a higher level of 
average DVA within the industry. 
On the contrary, compared to the other sectors, the electronics and motor vehicle 
industries have much lower averages of DVA in both regions. A lower average DVA means that 
a greater share of FVA must exist. As a result, we can conclude that these two industries are 
more networked than the food products industry, which makes sense. The motor vehicle and 
electronics industries are more capable of being networked and fragmented because of the way in 
which they are assembled. For example, clothing within the textiles industry is manufactured as a 
continuous process—the yarn turns into the cloth, which turns into a t-shirt. On the other hand, 
electronics and cars go through an assembly process—parts are imported from all over the place 
and assembled into the final product, which is comprised of these many different intermediate 
components. For instance, an iPhone requires a tiny camera piece and smart phone processor; a 
car requires wheel, seat, motor assembly, and more. The phenomenon of globalization has 
enabled the inherent nature of industries such as motor vehicles and electronics to be magnified 
and strengthened in that it has produced a division of labor with new methods of specialization, a 
manifestation that leads directly to the fragmentation of production. From here on out, the world 
becomes entirely connected, as manufacturing processes are dispersed among different firms, 
through different hierarchies, and across many countries. For complex industries like electronics, 
the general export-processing model in terms of outsourcing has intensified, in that production 
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responsibilities are split up across many different locations in the extended network (Steinfeld, 
2010). 
However, it is important to note that only some sectors are able to take advantage of this 
export-processing model. Export processing is common in many developing countries, as it is 
often used where there is a need to break the production process apart in order to obtain cheap 
labor. For example, integrated circuits, a component used within electronics products, are highly 
advanced pieces. Part of their production process is the packaging, which is labor intensive. In 
other words, cheap labor is needed in order to package and test these circuits. As as long as we 
are dealing with an industry in which its production processes can be fragmented—such as 
electronics—then export-processing zones are useful. The fact that the electronics industries in 
both EU and EA have a lower average DVA in its exports speaks to the outsourcing and division 
of production tasks that take place particularly within this industry. In short, because EU has a 
larger average DVA than EA in four out of the six industries, it can be concluded that as a whole, 
the European region is less networked than the East Asian region.   
 Since China is the focus of this thesis, it is essential to specifically determine what 
distinguishes East Asia from Europe so that we can ultimately assess China’s place within this 
unique East Asian region. These distinctions have been mentioned throughout the regional cross 
comparison above, though not emphasized as defining characteristics of East Asia specifically. 
Based on our data, the East Asian region is distinct from Europe in the following ways: it is a 
very networked, interconnected, highly regionalized system; there is much variance within the 
region; and lastly, as a result of the first two characteristics, a unique East Asian “growth model” 
has come to form that facilitates efficient trade, a natural spreading of network production 
systems, and thus, the exceptional growth that China has seen since 2000.  
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These distinctions are especially evident within the electronics industry data, which 
demonstrates yet again why this industrial sector is particularly significant to East Asia. In regard 
to EA, out of all six of the examined industries, the electronics industry has, by far, the smallest 
measure of AVG of DVA in each year and the largest measure of SD in each year. Controlling 
for industry, the former explains why the electronics industry is incredibly networked and 
interconnected; the later indicates the degree of variance that exists. Controlling for region, these 
same patterns appear across EA when compared to EU. Therefore, we are able to establish this 
set of distinct characteristics for the East Asian region, all of which explain its dynamic and 
progressive nature that one could argue is not inherent—at least remotely to this extent—in the 
European region. Because East Asia is more networked and certain industries like electronics are 
capable of being broken apart and dispersed, China has greatly benefited in that it is able to 
export and outsource intermediate components to be manufactured. Ultimately these components 
are sent back to China for assembly into the final product. This ability for China to profit from 
the unique characteristics of the East Asian region further reiterates the “regional explanation” 
behind Chinese growth.  
D. China within the East Asian Region 
Now that we have conducted a regional cross-comparison of East Asia and Europe, as 
well as concluded why East Asia is so unique, let us address the question of how we categorize 
China in the midst of the East Asian model. In other words, is China alone as strong as it appears 
to be with exports and production? Or, does its success simply stem from the fact that it is a part 
of a regionalized system?  
In order to better assess these questions, let us first examine DVA exclusively for China’s 
electronics industry (instead of the entire East Asian region). To reiterate: this thesis focuses 
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largely on the electronics sector because innovation, technology and “know how”—all 
components of this industry—are often touted as key drivers of economic growth (Mansfield 
1995). It is no secret that a high-level of electronic sophistication correlates with technological 
innovation, which enables countries to foster economic development and growth. So, the trade 
data show that China’s electronics industry has a low share of DVA in its electronics exports, 
meaning that much of the value-added (VA) is FVA from other East Asian countries. Again, a 
larger share of FVA implies that China—as well as its electronics industry—is highly integrated 
into EA production networks. Table 4.6 below displays the shares of DVA and FVA within 
China’s electronics sector from 1995-2011. There is a large increase in DVA between 2000-
2008, which is right around the time of China’s electronics export boom. This upsurge in  
 
Table 4.6 — DVA and FVA shares in China’s Electronics Industry (C30T33X) 
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DVA (%) 26.4 22.6 31.3 43.2 44.4 43.8 45.0 
FVA (%) 73.6 77.4 68.7 56.8 55.6 56.2 55.0 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
DVA corresponds with China’s becoming a more important player within East Asia’s electronics 
network. Yet despite this increase, these DVA shares are still much lower than is normally 
expected for such a massive country. In fact, the OECD data show us that for China, the 
“domestic value added content of gross exports” is huge. If China’s aggregate export amount is 
massive—as it was in 2011, at $210 billion USD—one would expect the share of DVA to be 
great as well, since larger countries should be able to do more in terms of production. On the 
other hand, smaller countries, like Romania for example, are exporting lesser amounts. In 2011, 
its aggregate export amount was only $1.8 billion USD. That being said, the share of DVA 
within its electronics industry is almost twice as great as China’s, at around 85% in 2011 
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compared to China’s 45%. So, Romania is small with a small amount of aggregate exports but a 
very high share of DVA, whereas China is gigantic with a massive amount of aggregate exports 
but a low share of DVA. This makes China even more distinctive.  
To better understand the significance of what we are seeing, let us extract electronics 
industry data from Poland—a larger, peripheral and post-socialist country that is part of the 
EU—and compare it to China. It is important to note — China is around 31 times larger than 
Poland. Nevertheless, table 4.7 below shows that Poland’s electronics industry DVA in each of 
the seven years is greater than China’s. In fact, in 1995 it is much greater — by around 42% — 
and gradually decreases so that by 2011, it is down to 46.31%. Poland’s declining DVA  
 
Table 4.7 — DVA and FVA shares in Poland’s Electronics Industry (C30T33X) 
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DVA (%) 78.29 66.18 58.20 51.45 59.31 44.81 46.31 
FVA (%) 21.71 33.82 41.80 48.55 40.69 55.19 53.69 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
indicates that it began integrating with the rest of Europe as it emerged from the end of the Cold 
War. While its joining the EU in 2004 may have had some impact on this, the decline of DVA 
was already occurring prior to its EU membership. Therefore, it is clear that a country does not 
need the formal institutions of the EU to become part of a more networked region. 
Despite this large decrease, Poland’s DVA in 2011 is still larger than China’s. As a result 
of China’s size, one would expect it to have a higher overall share of DVA. In addition, 
controlling for the same six industries that have been previously examined, the data show the 
Poland’s average DVA across all seven years within five of the six industries—motor vehicles 
being the exception—is greater than China’s. This fact highlights the rarity that is China, in 
terms of being a huge country but not having a higher average DVA than a country of much 
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smaller size like Poland. This fact is quite convincing and remarkable, as it drives home my point 
about the significant role that East Asia and its regional nexus plays within Chinese 
development.  
Now, let us compare China to Japan, a high-tech, highly sophisticated, powerhouse 
country within the same East Asian region. This will also give us a better sense of the hierarchy 
that exists within East Asia. In the electronics industry, the data show that Japan has an average 
DVA of 86.50% across all seven years. This share of DVA is far greater than what is seen in 
China’s electronics industry (36.7%). The patterns that have been previously discussed related to 
region, in terms of AVG of DVA and SD, are also applicable to the country level. 
So, because Japan has such a large DVA in its electronics sector, we can conclude that it 
is far less interconnected in terms of exporting to other countries than China’s electronics 
industry is, with its lower DVA. In other words, Japan does a lot of its producing at home, 
whereas China is interconnected as well but with regard to importing a large amount from other 
countries. While Japan does export some of its final electronics products, these goods do not 
require the many inputs from other countries that China’s final electronics goods do. Instead, 
Japan is doing things from scratch—it does not need much help. China, on the other hand, 
outsources a huge part of its electronics industry before assembling the final product for export, 
which speaks to the large dependency that it has on exports from other countries. Both are 
considered to be “interconnected,” though it is important to make the distinction that Japan’s 
interconnectedness stems from its exporting while China’s stems from its importing. However, 
Japan is not just exporting in general—this would not qualify as “interconnected” or 
“networked” production on its own. Instead, its exporting consists of a lot of the high-tech 
intermediate goods that other countries depend on for their own electronics industry and exports. 
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By contrast, China’s electronics industry depends on the intermediate goods from places like 
Japan, Korea or Taiwan, etc. Despite these different forms of interconnectedness, China, Japan, 
and every other East Asian country are ultimately all connected to each other within the East 
Asian regional nexus.  
Our data and findings on China, Poland and Japan ultimately enable us to conclude that, 
indeed, the significance behind China’s success lies in the regionalism that is East Asia. If China 
was not integrated into a regionalized system and did not have various East Asian countries to 
outsource its intermediate goods to and assist in the manufacturing of its products, there is no 
guaranteeing that the sharp increase in DVA that its electronics industry has experienced since 
2000 would have taken place. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the export boom and 
subsequent growth China has undergone would have occurred. 
E. Levels of Development 
  Despite having thoroughly explored and analyzed OECD’s TiVA data from seven 
different industries, while measuring for average of DVA, standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation, there is still an additional level to this thesis that needs to be probed. Using the World 
Bank’s “World Development Indicator (WDI)” data, we will examine GDP per capita of each 
country in both the East Asian and European regions. GDP per capita is most widely used to 
determine level of development. Therefore, this section will address whether or not there is a 
relationship between level of development and DVA. Our ultimate goal is to take the results and 
use them to locate China on a map—where does it fit in amongst the countries of these other 
regions? What does the data say about China specifically? 
 A visual image is necessary in order to effectively show the relationship between GDP 
per capita and share of DVA. Therefore, figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 below display scatterplots that 
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have been created to provide snapshots—in 1995 and then again in 2011—of the relation 
between GDP per capita and share of DVA within East Asia and Europe. Level of development, 
or GDP per capita, which is most widely used to determine level of development, is on the x-
axis; share of DVA (%) is on the y-axis. Figure 4.8 below graphs this relationship, plotting EA 
against EU in relation to their electronics industry in 1995. While we do not see a perfect 
correlation in either region, there is certainly a positive correlation in both—as GDP per capita 
  
Figure 4.8 - Relation between GDP per capita and DVA in East Asia and Europe's    
Electronics Industry in 1995 
 
         Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
 
goes up, DVA (%) tends to go up as well. However, while the East Asian region shows a definite 
positive correlation between these two measures, the European region’s correlation is less strong. 
The points—in this case, the European countries—are a lot more dispersed among levels of 
development than the East Asian countries, which form a pretty distinct upward sloping line. Just 
to note—the one blue point that is a clear outlier above the other East Asian countries is Japan, 
while the blue point that represents China lies in the clump of countries around 45% DVA. We 
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will examine both of these countries more closely in the next section. The patterns of each region 
will be further analyzed in the paragraphs that follow as well, as we plot EA and EU separately 
in order to better assess each country within the region and the visible relationship between level 
of development and DVA.  
As discussed previously, East Asia has an overall higher SD than Europe, as its SD is 
greater in five out of the six industries that we examined. This larger variance correlates with 
greater inequality amongst the economies of countries in East Asia. So, some countries are 
producing quite a bit of DVA while others are producing far less. Figure 4.9 below displays a 
scatterplot of the electronics industry of East Asia in 2011. In terms of this relationship between 
GDP per capita and DVA, the large SD of EA does correlate with large gaps in levels of  
Figure 4.9 - Relation between GDP per capita and DVA in East Asia's 
Electronics Industry in 2011 
 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
development that we see amongst EA countries on the scatterplot. For example, there is a large 
gap in development between Japan and Vietnam, where Japan has a much larger DVA in its 
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electronics industry and thus GDP per capita (level of development) than Vietnam, whose DVA, 
and thus level of development, is much lower. In terms of China, we see that it lies in the clump 
of East Asian countries that are located towards the bottom left corner of the scatterplot. China’s 
DVA in electronics is low—as we have discussed—at 45.01% in 2011; its GDP per capita is 
$3,150.17. For a country of China’s size, both of these measures are quite small which explains 
its lower level of development. Lastly, the spread, or gaps, between EA countries—both 
horizontally and vertically—is substantial, which results in a few clear outliers. For instance, 
both Indonesia and the Philippines have low levels of development but high shares of DVA. 
Clearly they are not a part of the East Asian networks and thus have not entered into the regional 
production system. Consequently, companies have not chosen these two places to do their export 
production. Also, while Indonesia looks more like Japan in terms of level of DVA, it is clearly 
not exporting the high-end electronics products that enable Japan to have such a great level of 
development. Because of this, Japan will have a much greater aggregate dollar of exports 
compared to Indonesia, which will have a much smaller dollar value and be exporting cheap, 
poor-quality goods. Thus, no one is dependent on Indonesia, while many countries—such as 
China—are dependent on Japan for exports. These features speak to the heterogeneity of East 
Asia. The significance of East Asia as a heterogeneous region will be elaborated upon later in the 
context of theories of international trade.  
 Now let us turn to the electronics industry for the region of Europe in 2011. This 
scatterplot displays the same data as figure 4.9 does, although for EU and not EA. It is presented 
in figure 4.10 below. Unlike the large SD seen in East Asia, the SD in Europe is much smaller. 
This indicates that there is less variance among countries. As a result, the economies of EU 
countries are much more similar than they are in EA; their production systems are largely alike; 
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and overall, the difference in DVA between countries is not as great as it is in EA. Figure 4.10 
displays these characteristics well. We see that a pretty large clump of EU countries all rest 
around the same level of DVA (70%) in their individual electronics sectors. Unlike Korea and  
Vietnam in East Asia, for example, France and Germany do not differentiate much in levels of 
DVA and thus rest around similar amounts of GDP per capita, or levels of development. As was  
Figure 4.10 - Relation between GDP per capita and DVA in Europe's 
Electronics Industry in 2011 
 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
explained earlier, France may specialize in one pharmaceutical product, for instance, while 
Germany specializes in another. Yet in general, there will not be much variation in the 
manufacturing process of these pharmaceutical products. Furthermore, the majority of the 
countries in Europe rest at far greater level of development, or GDP per capita, than the countries 
in East Asia. While it is relatively easy to draw a line of correlation through the East Asian 
countries in figure 4.9, it is far more difficult to do the same for Europe in figure 4.10. Thus, one 
can conclude that a lot of these EU countries are likely not a part of the electronics network of 
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production. Because the EU networks ignore many of the countries within Europe, we are unable 
to draw an obvious line of correlation like that which exists for East Asia. Furthermore, Europe 
has a bunch of outliers, all of which are not a core part of the electronics network. Figure 4.10 
shows a large clump of European countries between $30,000 and $50,000 GDP per capita. In 
East Asia, Japan has the highest GDP per capita at $36,203. This difference can be explained by 
the overall greater average of DVA had by Europe compared to East Asia. Because of this, EU is 
expected to have this greater level of development. Lastly, the fact that many of these EU 
countries lay around the same level of DVA speaks to the homogeneity seen in the European 
region. Similar to East Asia and its heterogeneity, we will elaborate upon the significance of the 
EU’s homogeneity in what follows. 
In closing, it is important to reiterate that GDP per capita is most widely used to 
determine level of development. In turn, level of development is largely indicative of level of 
technology. This is why the success of a country or region’s electronics sector is often predictive 
of the success of its future growth and sustainability. For example, figure 4.8 shows that Japan 
has the highest GDP per capita and largest share of DVA in its electronics industry out of any 
East Asian country. So, more value is being added in Japan as less is being added in other 
countries around it. As a result, Japan has the largest level of development, and thus the most 
sophisticated level of technology in East Asia. Many would also consider Japan to be the most 
powerful country in the region in terms of growth and economic success. For China, its lower 
DVA correlates with a lower GDP per capita and thus level of development, which explains why 
its level of technology has not yet caught up to Japan’s. As a result, China is not at the level that 
Japan is within East Asia. Finally, it is important to note—the shape of the spreads of GDP per 
capita and DVA for EA and EU in figure 4.8 from 1995 are largely similar to those displayed by 
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each region in figures 4.9 and 4.10 from 2011. This speaks to the largely unchanging, or 
plateauing, of DVA that has occurred in both the EU and EA regions. This point will be 
elaborated upon in the last section of this chapter. 
F. International Theories of Trade to Further Explain the Data 
While we have now thoroughly presented, examined, discussed and analyzed the 
measures of average DVA, SD, coefficient of variation, and the relationship between GDP per 
capita, which is indicative of level of development, and share of DVA, there is still a story that 
can be told in order to even better explain the patterns we have seen in each region. By utilizing 
theories of international trade, we will now more thoroughly discuss the trends seen within the 
East Asian and European regions.  
Let’s start with East Asia. As mentioned above, the East Asian region displays a large 
standard deviation in its variance. At the start of this thesis, the ‘Flying Geese’ theory of 
development was examined, which essentially explains the various developmental trajectories of 
East Asian countries. These select countries underwent different paths of development, some 
earlier than others. As a result, a great degree of heterogeneity developed within the region. This 
heterogeneous East Asian region can be explained by focusing on older theories of international 
trade. The driving force between conventional theories of international trade is comparative 
advantage. By using these conventional theories of international trade, we can explain the 
interconnectedness and networking inherent within the East Asian regional nexus. It is this 
concept of comparative advantage that enables a country like China, despite its rather low share 
of DVA and level of development, to still have the ability to export and trade in such high 
numbers. In addition to the concept of comparative advantage, the gravity model kicks in for the 
East Asian region. This model says that, all else equal, more trade takes place between countries 
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that are located geographically closer together. The patterns of average DVA and SD that are 
seen in EA can be explained by a combination of comparative advantage and the gravity model.  
The combination of these two is what largely defines the regionalized system that is East Asia. 
On the other hand, more modern theories of international trade can be used to explain 
what is seen in terms of patterns across Europe. The countries of Europe are more mature 
economies. They went through the industrial revolution much earlier and thus are overall more 
sophisticated in terms of technological development. This explains why they are able to produce 
such a great amount of DVA. The combination of these factors results in less variation across 
countries—hence its lower SD than East Asia—and therefore, a largely homogenous region. The 
more modern theories of international trade emphasize this homogeneity, with a focus on intra-
trade instead of comparative advantage. Intra-trade refers to the exchange of similar products 
belonging to the same industrial classification. The term is usually applied to international trade, 
where the same types of goods or services are both imported and exported. Intra-trade allows for 
more refined degrees of sophistication. For example, a computer chip may be designed in 
Germany for a very specific kind of task, while a slightly different computer chip may be 
designed in France for a similar task. The two are not identical, but they are very similar. These 
products are called “differentiated products,” and speak to the similar levels of development that 
largely exist across Europe.  
G. China’s “Leveling Off Phenomenon”  
We still have not addressed one of the most curious patterns visible across the electronics 
industries of East Asia, Europe, and specifically, China. Figure 4.11 below addresses what I call 
the “leveling off phenomenon.” From 1995-2011, we can see that the average DVA in the 
electronics industries of East Asia and Europe has essentially rested at a plateau. There have 
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been minor increases and decreases, but largely, the DVA appears to have leveled off within 
both regions’ electronics industry. China, on the other hand, experiences something a bit 
different. As previously mentioned, an export boom occurred around 2000, correlating with the 
sharp increase visible in the DVA of its electronics industry in figure 4.11 below. As a result of 
this increase, the share of electronics industry exports amongst China’s gross export pie rose to 
Figure 4.11 - Average % of DVA of the Electronics Industry in East Asia, Europe and 
China (1995, 2000, 2008, 2009-2011) 
 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
almost 25%, or one quarter of all that China exports. This significant increase is indicative of  
China’s continuing economic growth and future sustainability, for the electronics sector induces 
innovation and dynamism, which correlates with level of technology, a status that is 
representative of level of development. Therefore, one can assume that after seeing this sharp 
increase in DVA within China’s electronics industry, the country’s level of technology, 
sophistication and development will continue to increase as well and leave China at an even 
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higher standing within both the East Asian region and global arena. However, around 2008, this 
increasing of DVA began to plateau and has continued to level off since then. 
So, there are two phenomena that are present here: one is the “leveling off phenomenon” 
that is existent in all three regions. The other is the fact that the plateauing is happening at 
different levels—each at around a 10% difference. China has plateaued at a share of around 45% 
DVA; East Asia at around 55% DVA; and Europe at around 65% DVA. The difference in these 
levels can be explained by the patterns in DVA that were examined beforehand. Europe has a 
much larger average of DVA than East Asia; within East Asia, China’s average share of DVA is 
certainly not the lowest out of all the countries, but it is not the highest either. Figure 4.9 shows 
this. These differences in DVA create the distinct levels of plateauing amongst the two regions 
and China seen in the graph above.  
In order to best explain the “leveling off phenomenon,” let us use the concrete example of 
a country-to-country comparison. For example, India and China each contain more than a sixth 
of the world’s population and have seen dramatic economic growth in recent decades. When we 
look at India’s trade data, we see that the DVA share of its gross exports within its electronics 
industry is high—as high as 85% in 1995 and down to 69% in 2011, still quite a large share 
especially since its GDP per capita is so low—in fact, much lower than China’s. Yet for China, 
the DVA share of its gross exports within its electronics industry is still much smaller than 
India’s. In 1995, it was as low as 26%. After the export boom, it increased to 45% in 2011, 
though this is still far less than the share of DVA seen in India’s electronics sector. So, what is 
the explanation behind these enormous differences? The answer is regionalization, or in India’s 
case, the lack thereof.  
India’s DVA of exports is so high compared to China because there is no Japan, Korea,  
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or Taiwan, for example, right next to India. It is not nearly as integrated into a regional system of 
production as China is with East Asia. As a result, India has to rely on its own resources in its 
exports, which explains the large shares of DVA that exist. This lack of regionalization puts 
restrictions on India in terms of what it can and cannot do—unlike China, it does not have a 
Japan to turn to in order to assist in producing the intermediate components of its final 
electronics products, for instance. 
That being the case, how can this information be used to explain the leveling off that is 
apparent in China’s electronics industry? Empirically, the four years in which we see this 
phenomenon—from 2008 to 2011—is certainly a limitation in that it is a relatively short period 
of time in historical terms. It is important to acknowledge this fact as we further analyze the 
plateauing of DVA. Nevertheless, let us think about this “leveling off phenomenon” as 
essentially a manifestation of a limit to China’s technological development. Again, the 
electronics industry is indicative of leading-edge technology in China. So, because this sector’s 
DVA has been plateauing, instead of continuing to increase, one could speculate that there is 
indeed a limit to China’s technological development due to the regionalization of the diverse 
East Asian nexus. The fact that China is a part of a region that has a Japan and Korea right there 
means that these two countries, with larger shares of DVA, greater levels of development, and 
probably more comparative advantages than China, are doing the more important tasks. As a 
result, a barrier, as one could call it, is essentially created for China in that it is much harder for 
China to compete with these surrounding, more superior countries. For India, it is the opposite 
effect—because India has everything to itself, it is possible that, say, twenty years from now, it 
could actually develop massive corporations that could be potentially competitive to Japan. In 
other words, India does not experience this barrier to growth that China arguably does. 
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The point is that for China, being so incredibly integrated into the East Asian network 
certainly has its advantages, such as the period of rapid growth experienced in its electronics 
industry or its aggregate size, which facilitates more exports and jobs because China has the 
ability to export a massive amount. These advantages counter India’s situation, where it is not 
part of a network and thus is not exporting nearly as much or generating as many jobs. So, which 
is better? China’s current condition with this abstract “barrier” but tons of exports and extensive 
job creation; or, India without a “barrier” but fewer exports and less job generation? This may be 
a matter of opinion, but for now, we see the “disadvantages” of East Asia’s regionalized system 
playing out in China, with the leveling off of DVA in its electronics industry.  
G. Conclusion 
 We have now thoroughly examined the data and results of this thesis. To best understand 
the data, the chosen measures of average, standard deviation and coefficient of variation are first 
defined and then explained. Then, by conducting a regional cross-comparison between East Asia 
and Europe, we are able to better assess what makes the East Asian region distinct from the 
European region. As a result, China’s role within the East Asian region can be categorized. This 
helps us better understand if China alone is as strong as it appears to be with manufacturers and 
exports, or if its rise is heavily dependent on the success of the surrounding East Asian region, 
such that China’s regional integration has driven its growth? The conclusions made after 
examining the relationship between DVA and GDP per capita — which is indicative of level of 
development — speak to the homogeneity that defines Europe versus the heterogeneity that 
defines East Asia. We close by shedding light upon the “leveling off phenomenon” that is seen in 
the electronics industries’ of East Asia, Europe and China. Ultimately, we conclude with the 
speculation that while China’s regionalization within East Asia is certainly advantageous in 
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many ways, it also has its downsides—having powerhouse countries such as Japan and Korea 
next door creates a type of barrier, or limit, for China in terms of continuous growth. This acts as 
a plausible explanation for the leveling off of DVA seen within its electronics industry. The 
chapter that follows will speak to the conclusions of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
A. Summary of Findings 
 In this thesis, I have examined China’s extraordinary growth through the analysis of the 
evolution, dynamics and trends of the content of Chinese exports from 1995-2011. I focus 
specifically on China’s electronics industry—since the level of technology is often indicative of 
the level of development—in order to make predictions about China’s future growth and 
sustainability. From a wider perspective, my thesis also sheds light upon the significance of 
China’s location within the larger East Asian region and whether or not this aspect of 
regionalization either enhances or limits China’s technological development and growth in the 
future. 
After a thorough analysis of the data, the conclusions reached are as follows: Overall, the 
East Asian region has a larger degree of variance, or inequality, amongst its countries and is also 
far more interconnected, or networked, than the European region. Thus, some East Asian 
countries are much more dominant—such as Japan—than others—like Vietnam. As a result, 
there are also large gaps in GDP per capita, or level of development, throughout the region. At 
the country level, East Asia’s high degree of variance signifies very large shares of DVA in some 
countries whereas other countries have very low shares of DVA and thus are doing little to no 
production. As a result, countries like Japan, with a high DVA, are dominant and the driver 
behind the East Asian production system, while Malaysia, for example, is doing far less and 
holds a much more minimal role within the regional production networks. In addition, the 
inequality that exists amongst East Asian countries speaks to the great degree of heterogeneity 
seen within the region, whereas Europe’s lower level of variance, or inequality, explains its 
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largely homogeneous nature in terms of a majority of its economies being around the same level 
of development as one another.  
On the other hand, East Asia’s low level of DVA indicates that the region is more 
interconnected and networked than Europe. Thus, the majority of the industries within East Asia 
are intertwined, as each country is adding to another’s FVA. For example, both Japan and China 
are “interconnected” though in different ways. Unlike China, Japan has a large share of DVA in 
its electronics sector—hence East Asia’s high SD—which implies that Japan is far less 
interconnected in terms of exporting to other countries than China’s electronics industry is, with 
its lower DVA. In other words, Japan does a lot of its producing at home, whereas China is 
interconnected as well but with regard to importing a large amount from other countries. So, 
Japan’s exporting consists of a lot of the high-tech intermediate goods that other countries 
depend on for their own electronics industry and exports. By contrast, China’s electronics 
industry depends on the intermediate goods from places like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc. As for 
Europe, it is far less networked as its overall high level of DVA enables European industries to 
function separately and without nearly as much reliance one another.  
In terms of China, data show that its share of DVA is lower than to be expected for such a 
massive country. With over $200 billion in exports, China’s economy is clearly enormous. Due 
to economies of scale and the diversification of its economy, China has the talent and knowledge 
to be good at all branches of production within its electronics industry. As a result, one would 
expect its DVA to be high when compared to a smaller country that does not have economies of 
scale or as diverse of an economy. When compared to Poland, a peripheral and post-socialist 
country that is around thirty-one times smaller than China, China’s share of DVA is still less 
even with Poland’s decreasing DVA levels. Furthermore, within the East Asian region, Japan 
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rests far above China in terms of level of DVA and GDP per capita, or level of development. As 
a result, its technological sophistication is also greater, which explains why China, despite its 
incredible growth, is still dependent on Japan for intermediate goods and other imports. Because 
China’s aggregate export amount is massive, one would expect its share of DVA to be great as 
well since larger countries should be able to do more in terms of production. These facts are all 
quite convincing and remarkable, as they ultimately point to the conclusion that indeed, the 
significance behind China’s success stems from its position within the larger East Asian regional 
nexus. 
Finally, after much discussion about DVA and its significance pertaining to both East 
Asia and China, the data show a rather curious trend that I call the “leveling off phenomenon.” 
Despite what is, in historical terms, considered to be a relatively short period of time, one can see 
that from 2008-2011, the DVA in China’s electronics industry leveled off despite its previous 
exponential growth between 2000-2008. Speculative conclusions can certainly be made based on 
the data in terms of why this plateauing of DVA has set in. I argue that this “leveling off 
phenomenon” is essentially a manifestation of a limit to China’s technological development. 
Again, the electronics industry is indicative of level of technology in China. So, because this 
sector’s DVA has plateaued instead of continuing to increase, one could speculate that there is 
indeed a limit to China’s technological development due to the regionalization of the diverse 
East Asian nexus. Since China has a neighbor like Japan—a powerhouse country with a large 
amount of DVA, a high level of development and great technological sophistication—a type of 
barrier, or limit, is arguably placed on China in terms of its continuous growth. Japan fills the 
role of a “senior member” within the East Asian region, as it experienced its development earlier 
than China and essentially took off after WWII. As a result, China came in as a latecomer to the 
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game of export-driven industrialization. So, having Japan as a mature economy at the head of the 
East Asian region arguably means that it does not make sense for China to be like Japan; instead, 
China can simply continue to utilize Japan’s sophisticated, cutting-edge skills—especially in 
terms of electronics—rather than trying to compete with them and duplicate their processes. 
 Furthermore, the way in which multinational corporations (MNCs) operate in China is 
different than how they operate in other East Asian countries like Japan or Korea, for example. 
General Electric (GE), Toyota, and Honda—all very powerful MNCs—operate in a far less 
integrated way within the Chinese economy than they do within Japan’s economy. This lack of 
integration has to do with the nature of China’s supply chain networks. The supply chains within 
Japan are far more integrated in its economy than the supply chains in China are. Hence, the 
greater level of DVA in Japan and the lower level in China. This difference in the nature of 
operation of MNCs could be yet another explanation for the leveling off of DVA seen in China’s 
electronics industry. 
B. Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis examines China’s extraordinary growth through the analysis of the evolution, 
dynamics and trends of the content of Chinese exports from 1995-2011. Its focus on China’s 
electronics industry specifically enables informed guesses to be made about its future growth and 
sustainability, since level of technology is often indicative of a country’s level of development. 
However, empirically there is a limit in that the OECD data only provides trade in value added 
information from 1995-2011. The leveling off of DVA in China’s electronics industry is seen 
over a period of four years, which is, in historical terms, a relatively short period of time. If 
future data comes out that shows China's electronics industry DVA continuing to level off, then 
we know it truly has hit a barrier in terms of technological advancement, which may indeed 
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indicate that there are downsides to China’s integration within East Asia. Yet if I am wrong, then 
a situation may exist a few years from now where Chinese DVA in its electronics industry 
continues to rise towards 55% or even 65% as its GDP per capita increases. Only the future will 
tell. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 3.1 — China’s Real GDP Growth 
 
         Source: Data compiled from http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
 
Figure 3.2 — China’s Unemployment Rate 
 
          Source: Data compiled from http://databank.worldbank.org 
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Figure 3.3 — China’s Interest Rate 
 
            Source: Data compiled from http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 — China’s Gross Exports: Electronics Industry (C30T33X: Computer, 
Electronic and optical equipment) 
 
         Source: Data compiled from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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Figure 4.1 — Diagram of Average and Standard Deviation Breakdown 
 
 
Figure 4.2 — Coefficient of Variation Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CV =   Standard Deviation (SD)   x100 
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Figure 4.8 - Relation between GDP per capita and DVA in East Asia and Europe's    
Electronics Industry in 1995 
 
         Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
Figure 4.9 - Relation between GDP per capita and DVA in East Asia's 
Electronics Industry in 2011 
 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 	  	  	  
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
60	  70	  
80	  90	  
100	  
%
	  D
VA
	  
Level	  of	  Development	  	  
(GDP	  per	  Capita	  ($))	  
East	  Asian	  Region	  European	  Region	  
TUN	  
JPN	  
KOR	  CHN	   HKG	  
IDN	  
MYS	  	  
PHL	   SGP	  
THA	  	  VNM	  
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
60	  70	  
80	  90	  
D
VA
	  (%
)	  
Level	  of	  Development	  	  
(GDP	  per	  Capita	  ($))	  
Key 
1). TUN = Tunisia 
2). JPN = Japan 
3). KOR = Korea 
4). CHN = China 
5). HKG = Hong Kong 
6). IDN = Indonesia 
7). MYS = Malaysia 
8). PHL = Philippines 
9). SGP = Singapore 
10). TWN = Taiwan  
11). THA = Thailand 
12). VNM = Vietnam 
	  	   79	  
Figure 4.10 - Relation between GDP per capita and DVA in Europe's 
Electronics Industry in 2011 
 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
 
Figure 4.11 - Average % of DVA of the Electronics Industry in East Asia, Europe and 
China (1995, 2000, 2008, 2009-2011) 
 
   Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/  
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Tables 
 
Table 3.5 — Chinese Export Data 
Product Description Sum of Trade Value in USD 
(1996-2013) 
% of gross exports from China 
Electrical mchy equip parts 
thereof… 
$3.68 billion 23.12% 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, 
mchy… 
$2.90 billion 18.23% 
Art of apparel & clothing 
access… 
$.7 billion 4.49% 
Source: Data compiled from http://wits.wordldbank.org 
 
Table 4.3 — Calculated CV in both EU and EA’s electronics’ industry (1995) 
1995 Average (DVA) SD CV 
Europe (EU) 65.63 11.99 18.27% 
East Asia (EA) 55.75 17.19 30.80% 
Source: Data compiled from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
Table 4.4 — Selected Industries 
1 C30T33X Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 
2 C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
3 C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
4 C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
5 C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
6 C25 Rubber and plastics products 
Source: Data compiled from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
Table 4.5 — Region with the Greater AVG and SD in Each Industry 
Industry AVG SD 
EU EA EU EA 
C30T33X Electronics 63.08** 54.53 14.24 17.86** 
C17T19 Textiles 70.20** 66.84 13.04** 9.62 
C21T22 Pulp, Paper 74.95** 69.19 7.69 12.86** 
C34 Motor Vehicles 57.71 61.37** 11.80 14.36** 
C15T16 Food Products 74.66 75.98** 7.11 12.48** 
C25 Rubber, Plastic Products 66.76** 66.01 8.01 12.01** 
** Denotes the larger value 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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Table 4.6 — DVA and FVA shares in China’s Electronics Industry (C30T33X) 
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DVA (%) 26.4 22.6 31.3 43.2 44.4 43.8 45.0 
FVA (%) 73.6 77.4 68.7 56.8 55.6 56.2 55.0 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
Table 4.7 — DVA and FVA shares in Poland’s Electronics Industry (C30T33X) 
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DVA (%) 78.29 66.18 58.20 51.45 59.31 44.81 46.31 
FVA (%) 21.71 33.82 41.80 48.55 40.69 55.19 53.69 
Source: Data gathered from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
 
